Inside Voices: Protecting the Student-Critic in Public Schools by Brown, Josie Foehrenbach
BROWN.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2013 1:37 PM 
 
253 
INSIDE VOICES:  PROTECTING THE 
STUDENT-CRITIC IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
JOSIE FOEHRENBACH BROWN* 
First Amendment doctrine acknowledges the constructive potential of citizens’ 
criticism of public officials and governmental policies by offering such speech vigilant 
protection.  However, when students speak out about perceived injustice or dysfunction 
in their public schools, teachers and administrators too often react by squelching and 
even punishing student-critics.  To counteract school officials’ reflexively repressive 
responses to student protest and petition activities, this Article explains why the 
faithful performance of public schools’ responsibility to prepare students for 
constitutional citizenship demands the adoption of a more receptive and respectful 
attitude toward student dissent.  After documenting how both educators and courts 
have mistakenly devalued important messages from young dissenters, this Article 
explores how to reformulate the doctrinal approaches used to resolve challenges to the 
suppression of student-critics and urges courts to recalibrate overly deferential 
assessments of educators’ claims that student dissent compromises effective learning. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The many youthful faces among the protesters of the Arab Spring 
and the Occupy Wall Street encampments exemplify the energizing 
role a nation’s younger generation has played in advancing demands 
for social change and institutional reform.  Youth’s challenges to 
official repression and governments’ infidelity to essential values 
serve as catalytic provocations.  However, protests and petitions by 
America’s public school students are too often ignored, squelched, 
and even punished by teachers and administrators.  These reactions 
reflect a deeply flawed assessment of the constitutional interests at 
stake when students speak out about perceived problems at school.  
Even in relatively recent American experience, repression has not 
been a governmental response reserved for youthful voices of 
petition and protest.1  However, when children and youth seek 
protection of such expression, they face particularly formidable 
obstacles in schools and courts.  The hostility to such expressive 
efforts by the young stems from a misguided unwillingness to see 
children as citizens and to see schools as invaluable sites of 
constitutional citizenship practice. 
                                                        
 1. For critical examinations of increasingly restrictive governmental responses 
to attempts to use public spaces for political protest, see Thomas P. Crocker, 
Displacing Dissent:  The Role of “Place” in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2587 (2007); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Clint A. Carpenter, The Return of 
Seditious Libel, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1239 (2008); and Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial 
Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581 (2006). 
BROWN.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2013  1:37 PM 
2012] INSIDE VOICES 255 
Protests at public schools have generated foundational First 
Amendment precedents.2  By examining controversies arising from 
students’ protests and petitions, this Article seeks to explore the 
constitutional parameters of children’s citizenship and to discern the 
nature and limits of school officials’ authority to restrict students’ 
efforts to seek redress for grievances related to school practices.  Such 
protest and petition activities offer vital citizenship experience for 
students, but they can also serve as valuable pedagogical 
opportunities for schools.  In addressing the student critic, school 
officials can deliver a practical translation of often purely abstract 
constitutional values, giving substance to core First Amendment 
precepts, such as the checking function of dissent within a paradigm 
of responsive and accountable governance. 
Regrettably, school officials’ reactions to protest and petition 
activities may often be fueled by concerns about how criticism could 
compromise their preferred image of infallibility or dislodge a 
claimed mantle of competence.  School officials may try to shield 
their decisions from student challenge, using whatever explanatory 
leeway can be found within relevant precedents to justify the 
suppression or punishment of the student critic.  Officials often favor 
the defensive stratagem of conflating a student’s allegation of 
misused official authority with the incitement of peers to flout the 
authority of teachers and administrators.  Such a conflation 
conveniently short-circuits sincere engagement with the substance 
and origin of student dissent, potentially allowing school officials to 
insulate themselves from needed scrutiny.  Even less self-serving 
school authorities facing the student critic may succumb to the 
temptation to react dismissively, discounting the speech’s potential to 
spur school improvement and ignoring the educational opportunities 
such speech presents. 
The doctrinal approaches used by federal courts to resolve 
challenges to the suppression or punishment of students who speak 
                                                        
 2. See Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating ordinance’s 
content-based prohibition of all picketing outside public schools except labor-related 
picketing); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
(holding students could not be punished for wearing anti-war armbands in absence 
of showing that such speech would materially disrupt school operations); Sch. Dist. 
of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963) (ruling that required Bible 
reading and recitation of Lord’s Prayer at start of each school day violated 
Establishment Clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that prescribed 
use of prayer, composed by government officials, to begin school day violated 
Establishment Clause); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) 
(holding that compelling public school students to salute the American flag or recite 
the Pledge of Allegiance violated the First Amendment). 
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out against perceived injustice or dysfunction at school too often 
reinforce school officials’ distorted appraisal of what is at stake in 
such controversies.  The content of the constitutional principles that 
should guide school officials and courts as they strive to strike an 
appropriate balance between free expression and institutional 
functioning merits renewed examination.  Clarifying the 
constitutional dimensions of schools’ instructional agenda could also 
help to counteract recent developments in the law of qualified 
immunity that may have effectively removed potential legal liability as 
a disincentive to deploying maximally restrictive responses against 
student dissenters.  This topic has also taken on heightened urgency 
as Garcetti v. Ceballos3 licensed greater restrictions of public employee 
speech and cast a shadow over teachers’ ability to speak out about 
administrative or instructional problems in schools.  
This Article’s primary aim is to offer educators an explanation of 
why schools must adopt a more receptive and respectful attitude 
toward student dissent if they are to faithfully perform their 
obligation to prepare students for constitutional citizenship.  This 
Article considers how federal courts could reinforce that 
understanding of schools’ obligations by according less deference to 
school authorities’ assertions that student dissent compromises 
effective learning.  Indeed, courts should recognize that a repressive 
response to a student critic can compromise effective education for 
citizenship far more than the airing of student grievances ever could. 
In cases like West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,4 Brown 
v. Board of Education,5 and School District of Abington Township v. 
Schempp,6 children have been agents of transformative American legal 
reforms that began in public schools but later reshaped the wider 
constitutional consciousness.  By recognizing the value of the 
perspectives children can offer from within American classrooms and 
affording appropriately structured outlets for their nascent political 
activism, our schools can come closer to fulfilling their mission to 
awaken American children to the duties of constitutional citizenship.  
Children are frequently admonished to “use your inside voice” by 
supervising adults.  In our public schools, that injunction to quiet 
down could be recast as an invitation to speak up as educators and 
courts recognize that preparing a child to exercise the citizen’s 
                                                        
 3. 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that a public employee’s statements made 
pursuant to his job duties did not warrant First Amendment protection). 
 4. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejecting the separate but equal doctrine as applied to 
public schools). 
 6. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
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prerogative to dissent may require extending vigilant constitutional 
protection to the student-critic. 
I. CULTIVATING CITIZENSHIP CAPABILITIES:  THE IMPORTANCE OF 
DISSENT AND THE POWER OF PETITION 
As a defining element of America’s constitutionally enforced self-
concept,7 dissent takes many forms and potentially takes aim at a 
variety of targets, challenging established conventions and 
institutions.  Dissent offers a wide range of benefits to American 
society and its citizens, and the protection of dissent should be 
understood as a structural imperative as well as an individual’s right-
based expectation.  Cultivating the ability to critically engage with 
authority should therefore be a central component of citizenship 
education. 
Dissent aimed at public officials offers practical assistance as it 
challenges authority, spurring institutional self-scrutiny and 
recommending needed reforms.8  Unchallenged orthodoxy can stifle 
the individual spirit and sap societies’ creative energy.9  Extending 
vigorous First Amendment protection to dissenters affirms their 
potential contributions and signals receptiveness to necessary 
correction, an attribute of good and legitimate governance.  A 
vigilant and critical citizenry exerts an essential corrective influence 
on the misdeeds and miscalculations of our public officials.  Vincent 
Blasi describes the “checking value” of speech in exposing and 
counteracting the abuse of official power.10  
Dissent that criticizes the government occupies the core of political 
speech, the most vigorously protected zone within the free speech 
                                                        
 7. Austin Sarat, Dissent and the American Story:  An Introduction, in DISSENTING 
VOICES IN AMERICAN SOCIETY:  THE ROLE OF JUDGES, LAWYERS, AND CITIZENS 1, 1 (Austin 
Sarat ed., 2012). 
 8. John Stuart Mill warned against suppressing dissent and the consequent loss 
of “the opportunity of exchanging error for truth.”  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, 
reprinted in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 21 (John Gray ed., 2008). 
 9. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 82 (2003) (observing that a 
possible consequence of making some views “socially off-limits” will be that “what 
was once ‘unthinkable’ can become ‘unthought,’” extinguishing possibility of 
change (quoting TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTHS, PUBLIC LIES:  THE SOCIAL 
CONSEQUENCES OF PREFERENCE FALSIFICATION 177 (1995))). 
 10. Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 523.  Blasi documents how the experiences and intellectual 
influences of the First Amendment’s drafters produced a certainty that inclusion of 
such a protective provision was essential given the “fragility of constitutional 
government.”  Id. at 529–37.  James Madison, in particular, stressed the citizens’ role 
in exposing and seeking redress for official wrongdoing, effectively rejecting the 
notion that such a role would be the province of an institutional press.  Id. at 536. 
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landscape.11  When public officials seek judicial validation of the 
punishment of their critics, they attempt to resurrect a seditious libel 
regime and strike at the heart of the First Amendment.  In his 
profoundly influential explorations of the theoretical underpinnings 
of First Amendment doctrine, Harry Kalven observed that, “despite 
its obvious centrality,”12 the concept of seditious libel had been 
perplexingly neglected as a reference point in the articulation of free 
speech principles until New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.13  In Sullivan, 
the Supreme Court acknowledged the concept’s utility in framing the 
analysis how free speech would be threatened if those criticizing 
public officials faced crushing defamation liability without proof of 
actual malice.14  The Court stressed the constitutional imperative to 
protect the “citizen-critic,” writing “[i]t is as much [the citizen’s] 
duty to criticize as it is the official’s duty to administer.”15  The 
“constitutional shield” bestowed on critics of official conduct 
embodied the “central meaning of the First Amendment.”16 
Kalven identified the punishment of the offense of seditious libel as 
the “hallmark of all closed societies.”17  Such regimes, Kalven 
explained, apprehend the dangerous power of criticism to 
undermine public confidence in, and allegiance to, current leaders 
and their policies.18  The treatment of this kind of criticism represents 
“the true pragmatic test of freedom of speech.”19  A government’s 
response to such speech reveals whether or not the speaker lives in a 
free society; “it is a profound tenet of democracy that no government 
                                                        
 11. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (plurality opinion) (describing 
political speech as “at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to 
protect”); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 375–76 (1984) 
(characterizing political speech as “entitled to the most exacting degree of First 
Amendment protection”); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 
(1964) (explaining that the First Amendment “‘was fashioned to assure unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by 
the people’” (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))). 
 12. HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 19 (1965). 
 13. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 14. Id. (holding that, to ensure adequate protection of speech and press 
freedom, a public official could not recover damages in defamation suit relating to 
performance of governmental duties unless the official could show allegedly 
defamatory statement was made or published with actual malice or with reckless 
disregard of statement’s truth or falsity). 
 15. Id. at 282. 
 16. Id. at 273.  In his iconic dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), 
Justice Holmes concluded that, notwithstanding the enactment of the Sedition Act of 
1798, the First Amendment could not have “left the common law as to seditious libel 
in force.”  Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 17. KALVEN, JR., supra note 12, at 15. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 16. 
BROWN.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2013  1:37 PM 
2012] INSIDE VOICES 259 
official has the legal power to silence such commentary about 
himself.”20 
The protection of dissent also serves other structural purposes.  
Respect for social critics ensures that minorities participate in self-
governance,21 incorporating potentially alienated outsiders into the 
body politic and diversifying the knowledge base for public decision-
making.  Such participation enhances the perceived legitimacy of 
government action,22 contributing to the maintenance of social 
peace,23 and improving the durability of citizens’ ties to their 
community.24  By resisting the reflex to regard the citizen critic as an 
enemy and remaining open to the possibility that criticism may 
demonstrate loyalty and concern,25 a social institution reveals its 
fundamental commitments. 
Further, by protecting dissent that expresses what is perceived as 
a minority perspective, a society invites the presentation of an 
authentic self and the reconsideration of claimed identities and 
alliances.  A society receptive to dissent promotes “engaged 
association” as the dissenter “seek[s] converts and colleagues.”26  
By protecting dissent a community demonstrates its respect for 
individual autonomy, allowing a person to explain her vision of 
“the life she endorses”27 and to commend that vision of an ideal 
life to others as an invitation for them to join her in its 
collaborative construction.28 
                                                        
 20. Id. at 15. 
 21. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1774 (2005). 
 22. Id. at 1775 (drawing on works of Stephen Carter, Steven Shiffrin, and Lee 
Bollinger). 
 23. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring) (arguing that repression of expression “menaces stable government”). 
 24. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED:  A MEDIATION ON LAW, 
RELIGION, AND LOYALTY 97 (1998) (“[T]he justice of a state is not measured merely by 
its authority’s tolerance for dissent, but also by its dissenters’ tolerance for 
authority.”); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 
18 (1999) [hereinafter SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE] (describing dissent as “a form of 
cultural glue that binds citizens to the political community”); Thomas I. Emerson, 
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 885 (1963) (noting 
“persons who have had full freedom to state their position and to persuade others to 
adopt it will . . . be more ready to accept the common judgment”). 
 25. Henry Louis Gates, Jr. has observed that “critique can also be a form of 
commitment, a means of laying a claim.  It’s the ultimate gesture of citizenship.  A 
way of saying:  I’m not just passing through, I live here.”  Henry Louis Gates, Jr., On 
Patriotism, NATION, July 15/22, 1991, at 91. 
 26. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 91 
(1990) [hereinafter SHIFFRIN, ROMANCE]. 
 27. C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 253 
(2011). 
 28. Id. at 266–67. 
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As Cass Sunstein has noted in Why Societies Need Dissent, “even when 
minorities do not affect people’s publicly expressed views, they often 
have an impact on what people think privately,”29 building the 
collective energy to dislodge outmoded, unfounded, or unjust habits 
of thought.  Sunstein urges vigilance in the creation and 
maintenance of such an expressive environment, writing: 
A well-functioning democracy has a culture of free speech, not 
simply legal protection of free speech.  It encourages 
independence of mind.  It imparts a willingness to challenge 
prevailing opinion through both words and deeds.  Equally 
important, it encourages a certain set of attitudes in listeners, one 
that gives a respectful hearing to those who do not embrace the 
conventional wisdom.  In a culture of free speech, the attitude of 
listeners is no less important than that of speakers.30 
To describe the cultural ecology most conducive to the 
advancement of First Amendment objectives, the enforcement of 
governmental accountability, and the promotion of individual 
flourishing, the Supreme Court has repeatedly identified an 
imperative for the preservation of “breathing space” for even the 
most intemperate, offensive, or controversial speakers.31  The First 
Amendment’s protection of dissent potentially conditions listeners 
and speakers to adopt useful attitudes, promoting tolerance and 
encouraging citizens to exercise self-restraint when tempted to stifle 
persons with jarring, unfamiliar, strident, or even hateful views.32 
Dissent will not always challenge the commonly held convictions of 
the governed.  Instead it may seek to end the enforcement of the 
preferences of the dominant, preferences that may be at odds with 
the common good or the good of an unjustly disempowered 
constituency that may in fact be a demographic majority.  The 
dissenter may press for the end of an oppressive regime that falsely 
projects an image of unanimity of interest and ideology.  Thus, the 
protection of dissent advances a project at the center of our 
                                                        
 29. SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 31 (drawing on research presented in ROBERT S. 
BARON ET AL., GROUP PROCESS, GROUP DECISION, GROUP ACTION 79–80 (1992)). 
 30. Id. at 110 (emphasis omitted); see LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY:  
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA 247 (1986) (describing 
free speech as “concerned with the development of a mind that is itself comfortable 
with uncertainty and complexity”). 
 31. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (“[I]n public debate . . . [we] 
must tolerate insulting, and even outrageous, speech in order to provide adequate 
breathing space to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.” (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 
(1963) (“First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive . . . .”). 
 32. See BOLLINGER, supra note 30, at 9–10 (suggesting that society is strengthened 
when its members cultivate tolerance for differing viewpoints). 
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constitutional aspirations—the elimination of injustice.  Steven 
Shiffrin argues that the dissenter can make an especially 
indispensable social and political contribution by “challenging unjust 
hierarchies” and advocating responsive change.33  Therefore, Shiffrin 
asserts, “[f]ree speech theory should be taken beyond protecting or 
tolerating dissent:  The First Amendment should be taken to reflect a 
constitutional commitment to promoting dissent.”34  
Drawing on the rhetoric of the iconic Brandeis concurrence in 
Whitney v. California,35 Vincent Blasi discerns a related aspiration 
within a First Amendment tradition that offers ample shelter to 
dissenters:  the cultivation of the virtue of civic courage among our 
citizens.36  Brandeis ascribed to the Framers a distinct vision of the 
civic life, stating that they “valued liberty both as an end and as a 
means.”37  Brandeis went on to assert that the surest means to achieve 
enduring social stability was to protect the opportunity to discuss 
grievances and remedies.38  Within this paradigm, “the greatest 
menace to freedom is an inert people,” and “public discussion is a 
political duty.”39  To facilitate citizens’ truth-seeking and truth-telling, 
Brandeis argued, government had to nurture relevant human 
capabilities, arguing that “[t]hose who won our independence 
believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to 
develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative 
forces should prevail over the arbitrary.”40  Thus, Blasi concludes the 
                                                        
 33. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, supra note 24, at xii.  As Shiffrin has perceptively 
detected, our constitutional culture reveals America’s complicated relationship with 
actual dissent and dissenters: 
[T]he First Amendment serves to undermine dissent even as it protects it.  
Of course, the First Amendment protects dissent.  It offers a legal claim for 
dissenters, and it functions as a cultural symbol encouraging dissenters to 
speak out.  Nonetheless, the symbolism of the First Amendment perpetuates 
a cultural myth.  It functions as a form of cultural ideology through which 
the society secures allegiance.  It leads us to believe that America is the land 
of free speech, but it blinks at the “tyranny of the prevailing opinion and 
feeling,” and it masks the extent to which free speech is marginalized, 
discouraged, and repressed. 
Id. at 26–27. 
 34. Id. at 91. 
 35. 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 36. Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage:  The Brandeis 
Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 696–97 (1988) 
[hereinafter Blasi, First Amendment]; see also Whitney, 274 U.S. at 374–80 (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
 37.  Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 38. Id. at 375–76 (“Believing in the power of reason as applied through public 
discussion, [the Framers] eschewed silence coerced by law—the argument of force 
in its worst form.”). 
 39. Id. at 375. 
 40. Id. 
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following: “Brandeis valued a strong doctrine of free speech largely 
for its contribution to the character of the political community, 
particularly the character of those who possess the power to 
regulate.”41  If government hopes to nurture civic courage among its 
people, government officials should not respond to criticism of their 
performance or policies by displaying the fear that is frequently 
masked by repression. 
Seana Shiffrin has recently proposed placing the “free thinker” at 
the center of free speech theory.42  Shiffrin persuasively suggests that 
adopting a thinker-based perspective illuminates the normative 
foundation for the constitutional protection of speech and locates 
the project of discerning First Amendment free speech principles 
within a larger political theory framework.43  Shiffrin connects the 
protection of freedom of speech to a democratic vision of citizens as 
“functional thinkers and moral agents” and argues that a 
government “cannot retain its legitimacy while undermining the 
conditions necessary for the development and exercise of each 
member’s capacities for free thought.”44  To respect the individual’s 
“interest in the protection of the free development and operation of 
her mind,” free speech theory must, in Shiffrin’s view, address how 
laws, regulations, and other governmental practices interfere with or 
frustrate that interest.45  To apprehend and counteract such injuries, 
free speech theory must also reinforce an appreciation of the 
spectrum of capabilities and opportunities the thinker’s interest 
encompasses.  For Shiffrin, that spectrum includes “[a] capacity for 
practical and theoretical thought,” for “[a]pprehending the true,” 
and for “[e]xercising the imagination.”46  To be a thinker a person 
must also cultivate the “intellectual prerequisites of moral relations” 
by acquiring knowledge of others and of the environments shared 
with them.47  Free speech allows this developmental process to take 
place.  Communication offers access to what others know and 
understand and facilitates the adoption of others’ perspectives in the 
midst of dispute or conflict.  It also creates an opportunity for the 
individual to be known, understood, and respected, despite 
                                                        
 41. Blasi, First Amendment, supra note 36, at 679–80. 
 42. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 283, 283 (2011) [hereinafter Shiffrin, Thinker-Based Approach]. 
 43. Id. at 284. 
 44. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Reply to Critics, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 417, 417–18 
(2011). 
 45. Shiffrin, Thinker-Based Approach, supra note 42, at 287. 
 46. Id. at 289. 
 47. Id. at 291. 
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difference.48  Such experience and exchange, Shiffrin posits, are 
critical if citizens are to develop the “strong and independent 
capacities for thought and judgment” that are the prerequisites for 
successful and meaningful democratic governance.49  
Shiffrin’s thinker-based approach to First Amendment analysis 
illuminates the link between the acquisition of critical thinking 
capabilities through expressive experience and the successful 
performance of the responsibilities of citizenship.  Although 
Shiffrin’s work does not specifically consider public schools as a site 
of dissent, her insights can provide ammunition to discredit schools’ 
arguments that restrictive reactions to student dissent are necessary to 
achieve essential instructional objectives.  Amy Gutmann has 
described the central objective of citizenship education as teaching 
children “not just to behave in accordance with authority but to think 
critically about authority if they are to live up to the democratic ideal 
of sharing political sovereignty as citizens.”50  As an institution 
charged with cultivating students’ “civic disposition[],”51 schools must 
not be allowed to exempt themselves from being a target upon which 
students may train their critical thinking skills. 
One particularly valuable mechanism for student practice of the 
skills of engaged citizenship is the exercise of the right to petition for 
redress of grievances.  Regrettably, this pointed and valuable medium 
of dissent addressed to the government and its representatives has 
become increasingly marginalized in constitutional theory and 
precedent, a phenomenon that has drawn mounting criticism.52  
                                                        
 48. Id. at 292. 
 49. Id. at 294–95. 
 50. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 51 (1987); see also Rebecca L. Brown, 
Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 180 (1993) (describing mature citizens as 
having developed “a certain degree of autonomy and capacity for independent 
judgment while still appreciating the value to be gained from wisdom and 
experiences of prior generations”); Richard L. Roe, Valuing Student Speech:  The Work 
of the Schools as Conceptual Development, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1269, 1271 (1991) (calling for 
vigilant protection of student speech in light of role free expression can play in 
enhancing students’ “knowledge, intellect, and capacity for rational deliberation”); 
Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism:  Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 
131, 188 (1995) (recommending that “a citizen needs to be able both to understand 
and internalize the norms of her society and to judge those norms against rational 
attack”). 
 51. See CAMPAIGN FOR THE CIVIC MISSION OF SCHS., NO EXCUSES:  ELEVEN SCHOOLS 
AND DISTRICTS THAT MAKE PREPARING STUDENTS FOR CITIZENSHIP A PRIORITY, AND HOW 
OTHERS CAN DO IT, TOO 19 (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content 
/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/LabReport_Booklet_August_2010.authcheckdam.pd
f (encouraging schools to embrace mission of cultivating students’ civic learning and 
civic participation). 
 52. E.g., RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE:  
SEDITIOUS LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT 
FOR A REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES (2012) (arguing for revitalized protection of varied 
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Calling for a re-examination of the constitutional status conferred on 
the petition right by the First Amendment, Ronald Krotoszynski has 
argued that the Petition Clause must at least afford citizens 
“meaningful access” to government officials.53 
Protection for petitioning as a means of registering a citizen’s 
concern emerged from an Anglo-American tradition that embraced 
“a personal right to bring complaints about public policy directly to 
the officers of government, up to and including the king himself, and 
to receive some sort of response.”54  During the early years of the 
American federal government, petitioning functioned as an effective 
complement to voting in making known the views of the citizenry,55 
and the drafting of the First Amendment signals the intent to embed 
a governmental duty to consider the grievances of the governed, 
including maladministration and corruption.56  In both its historically 
distant and more recent forms, the petitioner’s encounter with those 
wielding governmental power could spur public debate, effect actual 
                                                        
forms of petitioning); see also Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2504 
(2011) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (questioning the majority’s 
dismissive treatment of the claim that specific enumeration of the petition right in 
First Amendment text denoted entitlements distinct from the protection of other 
forms of speech).  The Duryea majority’s reading tracks rulings such as McDonald v. 
Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985), which concludes that the Petition Clause has no 
independent meaning and conveys only the protection owed free speech generally.  
Duryea, 131 S. Ct. at 2495; see also McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485. 
 53. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., supra note 52, at 17.  See generally Julie M. Spanbauer, The 
First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances:  Cut from a 
Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15 (1993) (examining the historical origins 
of the right to petition and its distinct role in regime of free expression).  In 
response to the role public protests have played in pricking the public conscience 
and spurring needed reforms, Krotoszynski adds that enforcement of a properly 
articulated petition right would preserve access to both an official and a public 
audience so that the dissenting citizen can contribute to the process of public 
deliberation.  KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., supra note 52, at 17, 51; see also Carol Rice Andrews, 
A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment:  Defining the 
Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 624 (1999) (noting that the right’s distinct character 
stems from the special values it serves, “giv[ing] citizens a sense of participation” 
while “help[ing] to keep the government better informed”). 
 54. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., supra note 52, at 6.  Even during the operation of the 
Sedition Act of 1798, petitioning of Congress was exempted from punishment.  Id.  
In the early years of the American Republic, the right to petition was seen as self-
evident and uncontroversial.  Id. at 109–10. 
 55. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:  POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 25 (2004). 
 56. Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History of the Right to Petition 
Government for Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 142–43, 154 (1986).  
Ironically, the petition right’s potential to “expose public oppressions,” 
dramatized in the congressional petitioning campaigns of abolitionists in the 
nineteenth century, spawned resistance to its use —resistance formalized in so-
called gag rules adopted to bar the introduction of anti-slavery petitions in the 
pre-Civil War Congress.  Id. at 154, 158–65. 
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change, and reinforce the foundation of accountability essential to 
self-government.57 
Even if one unwisely accepts the characterization of petitioning as 
“an imperfect form of democratic politics necessary only in times and 
places where universal suffrage does not exist,”58 the importance of 
this instrument of communication for a constituency like children 
and youth who cannot yet vote can be readily appreciated.  However, 
as will be considered in Part III below, the instrumental value and the 
constitutional significance of student petitioning and the airing of 
grievances about school in school, have been slighted by both 
educators and judges. 
In First Amendment jurisprudence, courts have recognized dissent, 
conceived most fundamentally as the presentation of concerns and 
complaints about the functioning of government, as a core 
prerogative of citizenship.  How public schools—institutions 
commissioned to help children understand and undertake their civic 
responsibilities—respond to dissent will shape student expectations 
about the content of their constitutional rights and roles as citizens.  
When responding to dissent, schools would ideally nourish and 
invigorate students’ expressive and analytical capabilities.  
Unfortunately, however, school officials have often overlooked the 
learning opportunities that student dissent creates, and courts have 
not consistently weighed those opportunities when balancing the 
interests in student speech cases. 
II. STUDENT SPEAKERS AND THE CONTESTED CONTENT OF AN 
EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP 
Within First Amendment scholarship, the analysis of how schools 
could actively promote free speech values by developing children’s 
capacities as speakers remains an oddly neglected topic.59  Far more 
                                                        
 57. See KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., supra note 52, at 13 (drawing on Alexander 
Meikeljohn’s argument that democratic self-government requires an engaged 
citizenry). 
 58. Id. at ix.  Mass petitioning by suffragists prior to ratification of the Nineteenth 
Amendment illustrates the significance of this form of political action for the 
disenfranchised.  Id. at 122.  See generally SUSAN ZAESKE, SIGNATURES OF CITIZENSHIP:  
PETITIONING, ANTISLAVERY, & WOMEN’S POLITICAL IDENTITY (2003) (emphasizing the 
importance of women anti-slavery petitioners in the abolition movement). 
 59. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Value of Dissent, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 859, 860 
(2000) (reviewing STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF 
AMERICA (1999)).  Solum praises Shiffrin’s work for moving beyond conventional 
court-centered accounts to examine the role played by schools and media in 
advancing free speech values.  Id.  But see S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three 
Rs—Repression, Rights, and Respect:  A Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 
119 (1995) (critiquing schools’ hostility to student expression); Abby Marie Mollen, 
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common are examinations of how far free speech principles must, in 
the authors’ view, be modified to scale back students’ speech rights at 
school.60  This trajectory within First Amendment scholarship tracks 
the path frequently taken by the Supreme Court in its interpretation 
of the constitutional rights of children.61  Examining this pattern 
across several decisional domains, Emily Buss has adeptly chronicled 
the Supreme Court’s problematic tendency to define children’s 
constitutional rights by “whittl[ing] down” adult rights into a 
shrunken form, calculating the content of children’s entitlements by 
“sloppily discount[ing]” formulas applied to adult claims.62  This 
“adult-minus orientation,” Buss persuasively argues, prevents the 
Court from responding to children’s differences in the application of 
foundational constitutional principles.63  As Buss has elaborated, 
faithful translation of how relevant principles should apply to 
children might require adapting the constitutional standard to 
impose greater or significantly different obligations on public 
officials.64  Mindful of the imprint their response to student-critics will 
leave on the constitutional consciousness of their pupils, educators 
must calibrate their response to conform to a kind of precautionary 
principle, acknowledging that “[c]hildren are unlikely to internalize 
the value of the civic virtues of participation and tolerance if their 
schools appear to systematically trivialize and ignore such virtues.”65 
                                                        
Comment, In Defense of the “Hazardous Freedom” of Controversial Student Speech, 102 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1501 (2008) (arguing that courts should insist on a showing of actual 
educational harm before validating school policies that restrict student speech). 
 60. See, e.g., ANNE PROFFITT DUPRE, SPEAKING UP:  THE UNINTENDED COSTS OF FREE 
SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 10 (2009) [hereinafter DUPRE, SPEAKING UP] (arguing that 
Tinker adversely affected the student-educator relationship by undermining respect 
for authority); Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First Amendment Category:  Bringing 
Order Out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving School-Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 717 (2009) (rejecting the premise that students’ speech rights are 
insufficiently protected at school and proposing that school-sponsored activities 
should be treated as a “nonforum” with regulation of student speech therein not 
subject to judicial review under the Free Speech Clause); R. George Wright, Tinker 
and Student Free Speech Rights:  A Functionalist Alternative, 41 IND. L. REV. 105 (2008) 
(recommending that school officials be granted more leeway to restrict student 
speech in order to minimize distractions from instruction). 
 61. Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity Through Children’s Rights, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 
355, 355. 
 62. Id. at 355, 364. 
 63. Id. at 355. 
 64. Id. at 356. 
 65. See Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights:  The 
First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 85 (1990) (advising that 
“[p]ublic schools, therefore, not only must intone the rhetoric of free speech, they 
must act and structure themselves to give credibility to their statements”); cf. Betsy 
Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship:  The Conflict Between Authority and Individual 
Rights in the Public School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647, 1654 (1986) (observing that if 
constitutional constraints are not stringently applied to school officials, “students will 
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When asked to apply constitutional guarantees in the public school 
context, members of the Supreme Court have repeatedly offered lofty 
descriptions of the public school’s role in cultivating a child’s 
understanding of constitutional citizenship.  In Brown v. Board of 
Education, the Court described public education as “the very 
foundation of good citizenship,” and as “a principal instrument in 
awakening the child to cultural values.”66  In Wisconsin v. Yoder,67 the 
Court endorsed the state’s articulated objectives for its system of 
compulsory education:  preparing citizens “to participate effectively 
and intelligently in our open political system” and “to be self-reliant 
and self-sufficient participants in society.”68  In Ambach v. Norwick,69 
the Court again stressed public schools’ importance in preparing 
students for active citizenship70 and in transmitting “the values on 
which our society rests.” 71  The Court described the state’s public 
school curriculum as constructed to “promote[] the development of 
the understanding that is prerequisite to intelligent participation in 
the democratic process.” 72  The Ambach Court underscored teachers’ 
influence on “the attitudes of students toward government, the 
political process, and a citizen’s social responsibilities,” exerting an 
influence deemed “crucial to the continued good health of a 
democracy.”73  In Plyler v. Doe,74 the Court again embraced a vision of 
America’s public school system as “‘a most vital civic institution for 
the preservation of a democratic system of government.’”75 
These consistent affirmations of public schools’ civic importance 
camouflage fundamental disagreements about the content of an 
                                                        
not come to an understanding of the value of a democratic, participatory society, but 
instead will become a passive, alienated citizenry that believes that government is 
arbitrary”). 
 66. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also San Antonio Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973) (noting the repeated affirmation of “an 
abiding respect for the vital role of education in a free society . . . in numerous 
opinions of Justices of this Court writing both before and after Brown was decided”). 
 67. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 68. Id. at 221. 
 69. 441 U.S. 68 (1979). 
 70. Id. at 76. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 78 n.8. 
 73. Id. at 79.  The Ambach Court relied on then-recent social science literature as 
confirming the important function of schools in “inculcating fundamental values 
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.”  Id. at 77 (citing 
RICHARD E. DAWSON ET AL., POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION 146–67 (2d ed. 1969); ROBERT 
HESS & JUDITH TORNEY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN CHILDREN 114, 
158–71, 217–20 (1967); V. O. KEY, JR., PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 
323–43 (1961)). 
 74. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 75. Id. at 221 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230 
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
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education for citizenship.  Since the creation of an American public 
school system, two starkly different visions of the mission of public 
education have vied for dominance.  In the social reproduction 
model, schools “inculcate students with society’s traditions and 
values,” equipping students to take part in democratic institutions, 
but aiming to preserve existing norms and practices.76  In contrast, 
the social reconstruction model casts the school as “a lever of social 
change” oriented toward reform of the status quo.77  Both models 
place education for citizenship on schools’ instructional agenda, but 
their prescriptions for how to deliver that education diverge sharply. 
A battle over educational methodology is intertwined with the 
debate about whether schools should facilitate the replication or the 
revision of social traditions.  As adroitly described by Stephen 
Goldstein, the more traditional prescriptive instructional model 
delivers “information and accepted truths” to a “passive, absorbent 
student.”78  In contrast, under an analytic instructional regime, 
students and teachers scrutinize data and values “as active 
participants in the search for truth.”79  Although versions of the 
prescriptive model may be regarded as the customary practice in 
American elementary and secondary schools, educational leaders, 
such as John Dewey, have long stressed that an effective education 
creates academic and civic proficiency by providing participatory 
experiences.80 
However, many educators and legal scholars question whether 
public school students can acquire essential academic knowledge if 
order and obedience are not stringently enforced.81  Establishing the 
requisite ordered atmosphere could require significant curtailment 
of student expression, but adherents of an obedience-oriented 
                                                        
 76. Anne Proffitt Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights?  Keeping Order 
in the Public Schools, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 49, 53 (1996). 
 77. Id. at 65 n.115 (quoting LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
SCHOOL:  PROGRESSIVISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1876–1957, at 118 (1961)) 
(examining progressive educational philosophy of John Dewey). 
 78. Stephen Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights, 
118 U. PA. L. REV. 612, 614 (1970). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See generally LAUREL N. TANNER, DEWEY’S LABORATORY SCHOOL:  LESSONS FOR 
TODAY (1997) (describing Dewey’s campaign for the delivery of an active, 
participatory educational experience in public schools). 
 81. See, e.g., DUPRE, SPEAKING UP, supra note 60, at 10, 258 (asserting that lack of 
order makes delivery of “serious education” impossible and linking disorder to 
misguided judicial intervention in schools precipitated by exaggerated student claims 
of rights); Bruce C. Hafen, Schools as Intellectual and Moral Associations, 1993 BYU L. 
REV. 605, 619  (stating that “only by submitting to the authoritative direction of 
teachers [can] young people learn the skills, attitudes, and understandings without 
which they cannot successfully sustain the operation of a democratic society”). 
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method argue such restrictions would result in little loss of real 
value.82  Instead, the restrictions imposed in a strict school 
environment guide a child toward maturity and engrain the habits of 
self-control expected of a responsible citizen.83 
In the First Amendment context, we can gain a vital perspective on 
the kind of citizenship education public schools offer by examining 
how freely students may speak at school and, in particular, how 
officials react when students criticize school policies and personnel.  
Evaluations of the scope of school officials’ authority to regulate or 
restrict student speech inevitably focus on a familiar quartet of 
Supreme Court rulings:  Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District,84 Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,85 Hazelwood School 
District v. Kuhlmeier,86 and Morse v. Frederick.87  However, an inquiry into 
the nature of schools’ First Amendment duties toward the dissident 
student speaker properly begins with West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette.88  In Barnette, a child was expelled from school 
for refusing to participate in the daily flag salute ritual mandated by 
state law.89  That refusal, rooted in the religious beliefs of the child 
and her parents as Jehovah’s Witnesses, can be readily understood as 
a protest against school officials’ unconstitutional demand to recite a 
formulaic affirmation of loyalty to the United States.90  Concluding 
that the state lacked constitutional authority to punish the objecting 
child for a “failure to conform” to such governmental demand, 
                                                        
 82. See Bruce C. Hafen, Developing Student Expression Through Institutional Authority:  
Public Schools as Mediating Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663, 666 (1987) (“[I]f free 
speech is to be meaningful, a citizen must have something worth saying, together 
with the maturity and the skill needed to say it.”). 
 83. Justice Powell was a proponent of this view.  See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 350 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (“The primary duty of school officials and 
teachers . . . is the education and training of young people . . . .  Without first 
establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their 
students.”); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 593 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(“Education in any meaningful sense includes the inculcation of an understanding 
in each pupil of the necessity of rules and obedience thereto.  This understanding is 
no less important than learning to read and write.  One who does not comprehend 
the meaning and necessity of discipline is handicapped not merely in his education 
but throughout his subsequent life.”). 
 84. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 85. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 86. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 87. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 88. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 89. Id. at 629.  The child’s refusal to participate in the flag salute was treated as 
insubordination, triggering the child’s expulsion.  Id.  Deemed “unlawfully absent” 
as a result, the child faced delinquency proceedings and his parents could be 
prosecuted for causing such delinquency.  Id. 
 90. See id. at 629–30 (explaining why Jehovah’s Witnesses’ beliefs prompted their 
refusal to salute the flag). 
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Justice Jackson emphatically rejected the state’s assertion that the 
enforcement of such a constitutional limit would dangerously weaken 
the government’s authority as an educator.91  Justice Jackson wrote as 
follows: “That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason 
for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the 
individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and 
teach youth to discount important principles of our government as 
mere platitudes.”92 
Justice Jackson went on to stress that daily school practices should 
not be shaped by a fear of intellectual or spiritual diversity.93  School 
life should not project “an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our 
institutions to free minds,” but should instead reflect that “[w]e can 
have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities that 
we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional 
eccentricity and abnormal attitudes.”94  Charged with both 
developing the talents of its students and communicating the 
demands of essential constitutional values, school officials had to 
acknowledge that they could not “invade[] the sphere of intellect 
and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our 
Constitution to reserve from all official control.”95 
In vindicating the child’s challenge to the pledge requirement, the 
Barnette Court clarified that it was the school’s response, not the 
child’s request, that hampered the delivery of an education in the 
nature of constitutional citizenship.96  The objecting child had 
actually created an opportunity to affirm a critical constitutional 
tenet:  “[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not 
matter much.  That would be a mere shadow of freedom.  The test of 
its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of 
the existing order.”97 
The Supreme Court again embraced the student dissenter in 
Tinker.98  In December 1965, siblings Mary Beth and John Tinker, as 
well as Christopher Eckhardt wore black armbands to school in 
opposition to the Vietnam War.99  The students were suspended based 
on a policy that had been hastily adopted only days before at a district 
                                                        
 91. Id. at 629. 
 92. Id. at 637. 
 93. Id. at 641. 
 94. Id. at 641–42. 
 95. Id. at 642. 
 96. Id. at 637. 
 97. Id. at 642. 
 98. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 99. Id. at 504. 
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principals’ meeting, convened to address reports of student plans to 
protest against the Vietnam War at school.100  Under the policy, 
students wearing an armband at school would be suspended if they 
refused to remove it.101  A memorandum prepared after the students’ 
suspension alluded to concerns about how friends of a former high 
school student killed in Vietnam might react to the armbands and 
reports of other students’ plans to wear armbands of different 
colors.102  Trial testimony from school officials, however, indicated 
that the main impetus for the “no armband” rule was not 
apprehension about how the black armbands could disrupt school 
activities or spawn student altercations.103  Instead, the officials acted 
because they believed “‘the schools are no place for demonstrations,’ 
and if the students ‘didn’t like the way our elected officials were 
handling things, it should be handled with the ballot box and not in 
the halls of our public schools.’”104 
The Supreme Court’s exploration of how the First Amendment’s 
free speech guarantees applied to student speakers in public school 
proceeded from two premises:  (1) students did not “shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate;” and (2) those rights would be “applied in light of 
the special characteristics of the school environment.”105  With their 
“witness of the armbands,” the Tinker siblings and Christopher 
Eckhardt sought to make their views public and persuade others to 
adopt them.106  Although the armbands prompted discussion both 
inside and outside their classrooms, they did not create any 
disorder.107  Characterizing the wearing of armbands as symbolic 
expression, “closely akin to ‘pure speech,’” Justice Fortas, writing for 
the majority, underscored that the students’ expression had been 
“entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct.”108  
This emphasis signaled what would become the Court’s central 
                                                        
 100. Id. at 510. 
 101. Id. at 504. 
 102. Id. at 509 n.3. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 506. 
 106. Id. at 514. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 505.  By highlighting that the evidence in the case showed “no 
aggressive, disruptive action,” the majority opinion aligned Tinker’s factual record 
with that of Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966), which provided the 
template for the Tinker standard and distinguished it from events set forth in 
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).  For an 
insightful examination of how these Fifth Circuit cases laid Tinker’s foundation, see 
Kristi L. Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 
1129 (2009). 
BROWN.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2013  1:37 PM 
272 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:253 
concern as it balanced student speech rights with schools’ recognized 
“comprehensive authority” to “prescribe and control” student 
conduct.109 
Foreshadowing the standard he would articulate in Tinker, Justice 
Fortas offered a robust defense of the value of student dissent in his 
book, Concerning Dissent and Civil Disobedience, published the year 
Tinker was argued.110  In the slim volume’s second chapter, “The 
Simplicities:  The Right to Dissent and Its Limitations,” Fortas 
observed the following:  “[U]nder our Constitution, the question is 
not ‘may I dissent?’ or ‘may I oppose a law or a government?’”111  
Fortas took young protesters’ demands to participate in political 
debate seriously and rejected portrayals of youth as either disengaged 
or petulantly rebellious, instead associating their activities with a 
“count me in” spirit.112  Praising the constructive ambitions of “youth 
revolt,” Fortas welcomed the opportunity such protest created “to 
reappraise the distribution of function and responsibility among the 
generations.” 113  Fortas argued that America’s older generation had a 
responsibility to guide young dissidents away from intemperate tactics 
that ignored the rights and needs of others and advised that 
“moderation, consideration, and sympathetic understanding” should 
be the hallmark of any response to youth protest.114  Fortas took care 
to confine the possible basis for imposing restrictions on youths’ 
expressive activities to a governmental duty to reconcile competing 
interests in a shared public space and to prevent harms that might be 
inflicted on other citizens in the absence of regulation.115  This duty 
does not emanate from officials’ defensive inclination to insulate 
themselves from criticism or challenge but only from government’s 
obligations to protect citizens. 
Tinker affirmed that school officials must have the authority to 
restrict speech that disrupts school operations or intrudes on other 
students’ rights.116  Such authority, however, did not extend to 
discipline based on “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”117  
                                                        
 109. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. 
 110. ABE FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 17 (1968). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 71–72 (presenting “a youth reflection,” which asked, “[s]ince inside of 
Me there is a Person, why should he not share in the shaping of my life and of the 
world in which I live”). 
 113. Id. at 79. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 21. 
 116. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). 
 117. Id. at 509. 
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Echoing Barnette’s call for special vigilance in protecting 
constitutional rights in the institutions charged with “educating the 
young for citizenship,”118 Justice Fortas invoked the specter of public 
schools becoming “enclaves of totalitarianism” in which students 
would become “closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State 
chooses to communicate . . . confined to the expression of those 
sentiments that are officially approved.”119 
Tinker prescribed that school officials could prohibit student 
expression only when they had “reason to anticipate” that the speech 
“would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge 
upon the rights of other students.”120  They could not suppress 
“expressions of feelings with which they do not wish to contend.”121  
Only by adhering to carefully calibrated limits on their authority to 
silence students could schools match the Constitution’s expectations 
for citizenship education: 
Any departure from absolute regimentation may cause trouble.  
Any variation from the majority’s opinion may inspire fear.  Any 
word spoken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that 
deviates from the views of another person may start an argument or 
cause a disturbance.  But our Constitution says we must take this 
risk . . . .  [I]t is this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of 
openness—that is the basis of our national strength and of the 
independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this 
relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.122 
Justice Black, in his dissent in Tinker, saw more danger than 
opportunity in student dissent.  Black reframed the issues in Tinker as 
whether students should be allowed to use schools as “platforms for 
the exercise of free speech” and questioned whether courts should 
wade into debates about daily school operations.123  To Black, 
protecting the armband-wearers threatened to “subject[] all the 
public schools in the country to the whims and caprices of their 
loudest-mouthed, but maybe not their brightest, students.”124  
Extending such protection would inhibit schools’ ability to impose 
discipline, which, Black insisted, is “an integral and important part of 
training our children to be good citizens.”125  Fuming that public 
school students were not “sent to the schools at public expense to 
                                                        
 118. Id. at 507. 
 119. Id. at 511. 
 120. Id. at 509. 
 121. Id. at 511 (citation omitted). 
 122. Id. at 508–09. 
 123. Id. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 124. Id. at 525–26. 
 125. Id. at 524. 
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broadcast political or any other views to educate and inform the 
public,” Black rejected the Tinker majority’s projected vision of a 
constitutional education126  Instead, he emphasized that children 
should be in school to learn, not to teach.127 
The imperatives underlying Barnette and Tinker became more 
muffled in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.128  High school 
student Matthew Fraser had given a speech at a mandatory assembly 
as part of an educational program in self-government.129  To 
nominate a friend for student body vice-president, Fraser offered a 
series of sophomoric sexual innuendos which the student audience 
greeted with reactions ranging from hoots and simulations of sex 
positions to bewilderment or discomfort.130  Before the assembly 
Fraser had shown the text of his remarks to two teachers who warned 
him that presenting this kind of “inappropriate” content could lead 
to “severe” disciplinary consequences.131  After Fraser’s speech, 
several teachers complained to the assistant principal and she 
concluded Fraser’s remarks had violated the school disciplinary code:  
“Conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the 
educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, 
profane language or gestures.”132  After giving Fraser a chance to 
address the allegations, the assistant principal imposed two 
punishments:  three days of suspension and the removal of Fraser’s 
name from the list of commencement speaker candidates.133 
Over the dissents of only Justices Marshall134 and Stevens,135 the 
Supreme Court emphatically validated the school’s disciplinary 
response.136  Stressing “the marked distinction” between the Tinker 
armbands’ “nondisruptive, passive expression of a political 
viewpoint” and the sexual content of Fraser’s remarks, Chief Justice 
                                                        
 126. Id. at 522. 
 127. See id. (“The original idea of schools, which I do not believe is yet abandoned 
as worthless or out of date, was that children had not yet reached the point of 
experience and wisdom which enabled them to teach all of their elders.”). 
 128. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 129. Id. at 678. 
 130. Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (providing excerpts from Fraser’s 
speech). 
 131. Id. at 678 (majority opinion). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. at 690–91 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that the district failed to 
show educational disruption as required by Tinker). 
 135. See id. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that because the disciplinary 
code had not given Fraser fair notice that “offensive” speech would be sanctioned, 
he had been denied due process). 
 136. See id. at 686–87 (majority opinion) (reversing the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ decision). 
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Burger’s majority opinion disdainfully described the Ninth Circuit’s 
contrary ruling as mistakenly equating “the use of lewd and obscene 
speech in order to make what the speaker considered to be a point in 
a nominating speech for a fellow student” with the wearing of an 
armband “as a form of protest or the expression of a political 
position.”137 
Revealingly, Chief Justice Burger anchored his analysis in historians 
Charles and Mary Beard’s description of how public schools should 
prepare students for citizenship:  “It must inculcate the habits and 
manners of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness 
and as indispensable to the practice of self-government in the 
community and the nation.”138  In the Fraser Court’s view, public 
schools must transmit a range of values “necessary to the 
maintenance of a democratic political system.”  These values include 
both “tolerance of divergent political and religious views” and an 
appreciation of the “sensibilities of others,”139 and consequently 
“disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly 
threatening to others.” 140  Schools must balance the students’ 
freedom to take unpopular positions in schools with the need to 
teach students the limits of socially appropriate behavior.141 
Expected to “teach by example,”142 school officials disciplined 
Fraser in order to communicate that “vulgar speech and lewd 
conduct is wholly inconsistent with the fundamental values of public 
school education.”143  Any other response would, Chief Justice Burger 
warned, signal that the specter presented in Justice Black’s Tinker 
dissent had come to pass—teachers and administrators 
“surrender[ing] control” of American schools to the students.144  
Perhaps alarmed by Chief Justice Burger’s sympathetic invocation of 
the authoritarian sentiments of Justice Black’s Tinker dissent, Justice 
Brennan concurred but wrote separately to stress that the Fraser result 
should be seen simply as an application of Tinker’s disruption 
                                                        
 137. Id. at 680. 
 138. Id. at 681 (citing CHARLES A. BEARD ET AL., THE BEARDS’ NEW BASIC HISTORY OF 
THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 683.  The Court noted that such standards of decorum are not unique 
to public schools, citing parliamentary rules of the U.S. House that proscribe the use 
of “indecent language” and Senate debate rules that forbid “offensive” references to 
any state or the imputation of “improper motives” to another Senator.  Id. at 682. 
 141. Id. at 681. 
 142. Id. at 683. 
 143. Id. at 685–86. 
 144. Id. at 686 (citation omitted). 
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standard and not as an enlargement of the scope of the school’s 
authority to limit student speech.145 
The Fraser Court’s vindication of school administrators’ disciplinary 
action suggested an emergent shift in the Court’s jurisprudence, away 
from the sympathetic embrace of student dissenters presented in 
Justice Fortas’s Tinker majority opinion and toward the more 
restrictive vision of Justice Black’s Tinker dissent.  Fraser could, 
however, plausibly be read to uphold school officials’ authority to 
impose discipline in order to modulate the manner in which students 
conducted their political exchanges while not endorsing the broader 
suppression of critical or controversial speech.  Unfortunately, 
subsequent cases did not appear to subscribe to this interpretation of 
Fraser.  
Two years later, the Supreme Court examined the nature of 
students’ expressive freedom when it considered the scope of school 
administrators’ authority to censor the speech of high school 
journalism students writing in the school newspaper in Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier.146  Prepared in a journalism class, the paper 
was produced with school district funds and equipment and was 
distributed within the school and to the surrounding community.147  
In late April 1983, the Journalism II teacher appears to have left 
precipitously to take a new job, and another teacher temporarily 
stepped in to oversee the preparation of the paper’s last edition of 
that school year.  When the principal reviewed the final edition 
proofs, he objected to two stories and ordered that they be excised.148  
One story examined the pregnancies of three girls who attended the 
school.149  The other recounted how students had been affected when 
their parents divorced and included a named student complaining in 
some detail about what she perceived as her father’s bad behavior as 
a spouse and parent.150  The principal did not believe that the teen 
pregnancy story had taken sufficient care to shield the students’ 
identities and also worried that the frank discussions of teen sex and 
birth control might be unsuitable for both younger students at the 
                                                        
 145. Id. at 687–88 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 146. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 147. Id. at 262.  The students working on the paper received course credit and 
were supervised by a teacher.  Id. at 268.  Page proofs of each edition had to be 
submitted to the principal for review prior to publication.  Id. at 269. 
 148. Id. at 263–64.  The stories that concerned the principal appeared with other 
articles on two pages of the newspaper, and, to expedite production of the paper, the 
last edition before the end of the school year, the principal decided to delete the 
complete pages rather than only the two stories. 
 149. See id. at 263. 
 150. See id. 
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school and students’ younger siblings who would have access to the 
paper when it was brought home.151  The principal also feared the 
divorce story intruded too far into the families’ private lives and was 
particularly concerned about the student authors’ failure to consult 
the spotlighted parents to verify the accuracy of their children’s 
accounts or to ascertain if they had concerns about the story’s 
impact.152 
Several members of the newspaper staff challenged the principal’s 
mandate to remove the articles, asserting that their First Amendment 
rights had been violated.153  The students lost in federal district court 
but prevailed in the Eighth Circuit.  The appellate court accepted the 
students’ claim that the paper served as a public forum and ruled that 
school officials could control the content of speech presented in such 
a forum only when, as in Tinker, such action was “necessary to avoid 
material and substantial interference with school work or 
discipline . . . or the rights of others.”154 
The Supreme Court quickly rejected the “public forum” 
designation for the paper, finding that neither the school’s past 
practices nor the terms of relevant policies reflected an intent to 
relinquish control over the paper as a supervised, curricular learning 
experience.  Instead, school officials had retained authority to 
regulate the paper.155  The Court stressed the significance of the 
difference between the speech in the excised articles and “a student’s 
personal expression that happens to occur on school premises,” 
which had been wrongly suppressed in Tinker.156  Accepting 
educators’ concern that the public might perceive that material 
published in a school paper bore “the imprimatur of the school,”157 
the Hazelwood Court linked to the need to ensure that supervised 
activities served curricular objectives, “impart[ing] particular 
knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.”158  School 
officials could regulate speech in these school-sponsored venues “to 
assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed 
                                                        
 151. Id. at 263–64. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 264. 
 154. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1374 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)), 
rev’d, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 155. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270.  The Court found students’ assertions that they 
believed that they could publish “practically anything” unsupported by school 
officials’ past course of conduct or the text of cited policies.  Id. at 269. 
 156. Id. at 271. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 271. 
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to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that 
may be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of 
the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the 
school.”159 
The school needed the ability to disassociate itself from speech that 
would be “disseminated under its auspices” but that would not meet 
the standards the school enforced to achieve its instructional 
objectives.160  In addition, consistent with their overarching custodial 
and instructional responsibilities, school officials “must be able to 
take into account the emotional maturity of the intended audience in 
determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially 
sensitive topics,”161 and can “refuse to sponsor student speech that 
might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, 
irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with ‘the shared 
values of a civilized social order,’ . . . or to associate the school with 
any position other than neutrality on matters of political 
controversy.” 162  The Hazelwood majority therefore concluded that 
Tinker’s standard did not apply when a school exercised control over 
student expression in school-sponsored expressive activities.163  In 
such circumstances, school officials acted constitutionally as long as 
their decisions were “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”164 
In dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Blackmun and 
Marshall, sharply attacked what he saw as the majority’s 
abandonment of Tinker’s vigilant concern for students’ expressive 
rights.165  To Brennan, the majority’s new approach to what was 
deemed “school-sponsored” student expression handed school 
                                                        
 159. Id. at 271–72.  This kind of problematic speech included written work that 
was “ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, 
vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences.”  Id. 
 160. See id.  (explaining that the school needed the ability to disassociate itself 
from speech that would be “disseminated under its auspices” but that would not 
meet the standards the school enforced to achieve its instructional objectives). 
 161. Id. at 272.   
 162. Id. (internal citation omitted).  The Hazelwood majority’s allusion to the need 
for a school to maintain a position of “neutrality on matters of political controversy” 
has not received much specific attention, but this formulation could be invoked by 
school officials to justify some disturbing conclusions.  See Anoka-Hennepin Sch. Dist., 
Agreement Reached on Harassment Lawsuit, ANOKA-HENNEPIN NEWSROOM (Mar. 8, 2012), 
http://www.anoka.k12.mn.us/education/components/whatsnew/default.php?section
detailid=233754&itemID=48062 (describing signing of consent decree in which 
Minnesota school district agreed to abandon “neutrality” policy that had been 
interpreted to bar teachers from intervening when LGBT students were subjected to 
harassment). 
 163. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272–73. 
 164. Id. at 273. 
 165. Id. at 282–83 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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administrators a menu of broadly worded excuses for censorship,166 
effectively allowing them to “camouflage viewpoint discrimination as 
the ‘mere’ protection of students from sensitive topics.”167  To Justice 
Brennan, the majority’s approach threatened to undermine both 
students’ expressive freedom and the schools’ credibility when 
seeking to convince young people that “our Constitution is a living 
reality, not parchment preserved under glass.”168 
In its most recent student speech ruling, Morse v. Frederick, the 
Supreme Court upheld a principal’s decision to suspend a senior who 
had unfurled a 14–foot “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” banner as he stood 
watching the Olympic Torch Relay go past his high school.169  The 
eighteen-year-old student, Joseph Frederick, had brought the banner 
from home, ostensibly hoping to catch the attention of TV cameras 
covering the Olympic event.170  When Principal Deborah Morse saw 
Frederick and his classmates holding the banner up across the street 
from the school, she demanded that the students immediately put it 
down.171  As Morse would later explain to the student, she believed 
the banner promoted drug use, an interpretation the majority of the 
Court accepted as plausible despite the banner’s “cryptic” 
phrasing.172  The principal anticipated that other students, school 
district personnel, parents, and members of the public would 
interpret the banner as she did and see a failure to demand its 
removal as a contradiction of the school’s unequivocal stand against 
drug abuse.173 
Reviewing the student speech precedents, Chief Justice Roberts 
stressed the “marked distinction between the political ‘message’ of 
the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of [Fraser’s] 
speech.”174  Chief Justice Roberts drew specific attention to the 
observations in Justice Brennan’s Fraser concurrence that school 
officials there had sought only to maintain order in a high school 
                                                        
 166. Id. at 282. 
 167. Id. at 288. 
 168. Id. at 290 (citing Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 972 (5th Cir. 
1972)). 
 169. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397–98 (2007). 
 170. Id. at 396–97, 401.  The school’s staff and students had been given 
permission to leave the school to watch as the Torch Relay passed by.  The Court 
accepted that students were subject to school policies addressing behavior while 
on an approved social event or class trip even if, like Frederick, they were not 
standing on school property and had not yet entered the school building that 
day.  Id. at 397, 401. 
 171. Id. at 398. 
 172. Id. at 401. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 404 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680 (1996)). 
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assembly and that there had been no indication that school officials 
reacted to Fraser’s speech because they disagreed with his views.175  
Finding the analytic formula used in Fraser “unclear,” Chief Justice 
Roberts extracted two key principles from that opinion:  “[T]he 
constitutional rights of students in public school are not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings”176 
and “the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute” given 
that the Fraser Court had not required a demonstration of substantial 
disruption.177 
The Chief Justice then framed his consideration of whether 
Frederick’s punishment could be reconciled with the First 
Amendment by noting that the Court’s school search and drug 
testing precedents had established that deterring student drug use 
was clearly an important, and perhaps even a compelling, interest in 
light of the special physical harms associated with drug abuse during 
critical periods of child development.178  In his synthesis of student 
speech precedents, the Chief Justice endorsed giving school officials 
some latitude to regulate or even punish student speech in the 
absence of substantial disruption.179  However, he explicitly re-
affirmed Tinker’s warning that schools may not prohibit student 
speech based only on “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of 
disturbance” or “a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint” and 
underscored that Principal Morse’s reaction was not grounded in “an 
abstract desire to avoid controversy.”180  Moreover, he forcefully 
rebuffed the claim that prior precedent allowed school officials to 
restrict any student speech they deemed “plainly offensive.”181 
                                                        
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 404–05 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682). 
 177. Id. at 405. 
 178. Id. at 407.  Morse specifically highlighted that Congress had, pursuant to a 
federal funding condition, mandated that schools provide an anti-drug 
curriculum and present “a clear and consistent message that . . . the illegal use 
of drugs [is] wrong and harmful.”  Id. at 408 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 7114(d)(6) 
(2000 & Supp. IV 2006)). 
 179. Id. at 404. 
 180. Id. at 408–09 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 508–09 (1969)). 
 181. Id. at 409.  The National School Boards Association had argued, “[s]ince 
school officials handle day-to-day operations of their schools, and school board 
members are typically members of the local community, they are best situated to 
apply evolving community standards in their schools and to determine whether a 
student’s speech is counter to or ‘plainly offensive’ to their educational mission.”  
Brief of Amici Curiae National School Boards et al. in Support of Petitioners at 17, 
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (No. 06-278). 
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In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Kennedy, Justice Alito 
stressed the danger ahead if there was any hint that student speech 
could be suppressed based on the vague assertion that such speech 
interfered with the school’s “educational mission.”182  This kind of 
justification, Justice Alito wrote, would allow public school officials to 
regulate speech simply because they disagree with the viewpoint—a 
rationale that “strikes at the very heart of the First Amendment.”183  
To cabin Morse’s implications, Justice Alito offered this careful 
description of its holding: 
I join the opinion of the Court on the understanding that (1) it 
goes no further than to hold that a public school may restrict 
speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating 
illegal drug use and (2) it provides no support for any restriction of 
speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any 
political or social issue, including speech on issues such as the 
wisdom of the war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for 
medicinal use.  I join the opinion of the Court on the 
understanding that the opinion does not hold that the special 
characteristics of the public schools necessarily justify any other 
speech restrictions.184   
Thus, although Morse’s endorsement of a very specific form of 
viewpoint discrimination has drawn criticism,185 both the opinion for 
the court and the concurrence of Justices Alito and Kennedy 
recognize important limitations on schools’ authority to curtail 
student speech and express concern about the potential abuse of 
school authority to silence student speech that is political or 
controversial, telegraphing at least some hope for the protection of 
future student dissenters.186 
                                                        
 182. Morse, 551 U.S. at 423 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 422. 
 185. See id. at 437 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Morse analysis as 
“invit[ing] stark viewpoint discrimination” by school officials); see also Hans Bader, 
BONG HiTS 4 JESUS:  The First Amendment Takes a Hit, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 133, 142 
(describing Morse as departing from understanding that “[w]hatever other limits the 
Supreme Court has placed on students’ free speech rights in the past, it had never 
countenanced viewpoint discrimination of student speech prior to Morse”); The 
Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 185, 300 (2007) (decrying 
Morse as “overreaching and too unprincipled to allow for consistent application in 
practice” and predicting it “will make it easy for other schools and other courts to 
discover new subject areas in which student speech can be prohibited”). 
 186. See Emily Gold Waldman, A Post-Morse Framework for Students’ Potentially 
Hurtful Speech (Religious and Otherwise), 37 J.L. & EDUC. 463, 484–86 (2008) 
(describing amici filings of religious legal advocacy groups asserting apprehensions 
about implications for student religious speech at school if the Court accepted the 
argument that schools could restrict speech that officials saw as “counter to the 
school’s educational mission”). 
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The Tinker Court rejected the idea that student dissent was 
incompatible with the instructional mission of the public schools,187 
emphasizing that “the process of education in a democracy must be 
democratic.” 188  As the Court qualified its endorsement of students’ 
expressive liberty, authorizing limitations on student speech in Fraser, 
Hazelwood, and Morse, school officials were able to seize on the often 
imprecise descriptions of the scope of their authority to justify 
silencing or punishing student speakers, especially those who took 
issue with school policies or the conduct of teachers or 
administrators.  School officials, like reviewing courts, failed to 
consistently resist what Jamin Raskin has aptly described as the 
“undertow of institutional authoritarianism.”189  As Justice Thomas 
observed in his Morse concurrence, the Supreme Court’s 
“jurisprudence now says that students have a right to speak in schools 
except when they do not,”190 putting student-critics and effective 
education for citizenship at risk. 
III. DISSENT DEVALUED:  THE VULNERABILITY OF THE STUDENT AS A 
CITIZEN CRITIC 
Can public school students serve as citizen-critics?  As a matter of 
First Amendment doctrine, should they be afforded vigilant 
protection when they speak out against what they identify as official 
misconduct, deficient performance of duty, obstruction of needed 
change, or the unjust use of authority?  This Article argues that 
children can and have assumed the role of responsible citizen-critics 
in American schools as well as in other social contexts.191  However, 
school officials, both teachers and administrators, often devalue or 
dismiss the messages of the youngest dissenters.  Even when this 
mistaken reaction prompts judicial correction, the articulated 
rationale for the protection of student speech frequently underplays 
the value of critical student speech and rarely considers how the 
                                                        
 187. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507–11 (1969); 
see also Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management:  The History and Theory of 
the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1779–80 (1987) (construing Tinker as 
offering a variation on the analysis used in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 
116 (1972), which focused on “whether the manner of expression is basically 
incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time”). 
 188. The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 60, 159 (1969). 
 189. Jamin B. Raskin, No Enclaves of Totalitarianism:  The Triumph and Unrealized 
Promise of the Tinker Decision, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1193, 1201, 1205–06 (2009). 
 190. Morse, 551 U.S. at 418 (Thomas, J., concurring).  Unfortunately, Justice 
Thomas’s preferred corrective to the vagaries of the Supreme Court’s analysis of 
children’s rights under the Free Speech Clause would be to “dispense with Tinker 
altogether.”  Id. at 422. 
 191. See infra notes 200–33 and accompanying text. 
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suppression of student criticism could be at odds with schools’ 
responsibility to inculcate the habits of citizenship.  Moreover, recent 
rulings on qualified immunity may have significantly diminished fear 
about legal liability as a force inhibiting school officials’ tendency to 
react repressively.192 
If, as Steven Shiffrin has argued, the First Amendment should be 
understood to “reflect a commitment to promoting dissent”193 in order 
to realize an overarching constitutionally grounded ambition to 
cultivate citizens’ capacities to identify and redress injustice, such a 
commitment would inform the nation’s educational enterprise.194  
However, as Shiffrin has lamented, such an ethos is often not only 
absent from American classrooms but actively discouraged there.195  
As will be documented in this section, today’s student critic should 
expect hostility from school personnel and inconsistent protection 
from federal courts.  
A. The Persistent Presence of the Child’s Dissenting Voice 
American children have occupied an important place in both the 
rhetoric and reality of our constitutional culture.  The special power 
of a child’s voice in presenting an indictment of unjust authority 
reverberates across centuries of American political dissent, emanating 
from our founding generation.  The rhetoric of the Revolutionary 
Era repeatedly portrayed the American colonist as “the rightfully 
rebellious child of autocratic parents.”196  Thomas Paine, in 
particular, favored the use of images of suffering children to 
“summon both the feeling of a situation demanding immediate 
response and the confidence that present inequities and difficulties 
will be overcome” as the empowered colonial child rises up heroically 
                                                        
 192. See infra notes 364–81 and accompanying text. 
 193. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, supra note 24, at 91. 
 194. Id. at 112. 
 195. See id. at 113 (noting how elements of public school curricula such as daily 
ritual recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance and content of social studies texts 
powerfully reinforce models of citizenship rooted in conformity and submission to 
governmental authority); see also Brent T. White, Ritual, Emotion, and Political Belief:  
The Search for the Constitutional Limit to Patriotic Education in Public Schools, 43 GA. L. 
REV. 447, 449, 453–54 (2009) (arguing that the primary ambition and predominant 
effect of patriotic education curriculum, including daily pledge recitation, is the 
creation of emotional attachment to the nation in a manner that suppresses critical 
appraisal of government). 
 196. GILLIAN BROWN, THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED:  THE LOCKEAN LEGACY IN 
EARLY AMERICAN CULTURE 16 (2001) (connecting the recurrent use of images of 
aggrieved children to the installation of citizen consent at the center of American 
constitutional vision). 
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against its cruel and imperial parent.197  In the nineteenth century as 
the country grappled with the coming of the Civil War, Walt 
Whitman would continue to use depictions of a child as a persuasive 
vehicle in political and social debate, evoking the child as “bearer of 
authenticity and ‘true consciousness’” to reflect back the problematic 
nature of the society that would shape and potentially deform the 
developing child.198 
Children, like other dissenters, have raised their voices to express 
“the fears, hopes, and aspirations of the less powerful to those in 
power.”199  Child workers advanced the struggle for labor rights.200  
Small girls faced down police and stood their ground as they went on 
strike for fair wages at box and match factories.201  Messenger boys 
protested against excessive work schedules, pay delays, and worker 
fines.202  Young girls from New York City’s garment factories marched 
for safer working conditions and an end to exploitation, and 
newsboys staged strikes when paper owners tried to price them out of 
their jobs and replace them with scab sellers.203 
As active participants in the civil rights protests of the 1950s and 
1960s, black children and youth met shocking official brutality with 
courage and dignity, inspiring black and white Americans to press 
forward for the enactment of civil rights statutes.204  Before Rosa 
                                                        
 197. See id. at 100–06 (analyzing Paine’s use of images of a wronged but ultimately 
triumphant child to project the image of colonists’ course from “subjection to self-
government”). 
 198. CAROLINE F. LEVANDER, CRADLE OF LIBERTY:  RACE, THE CHILD, AND NATIONAL 
BELONGING FROM THOMAS JEFFERSON TO W.E.B. DU BOIS 9–12 (2006). 
 199. SHIFFRIN, ROMANCE, supra note 26, at 96. 
 200. Caroline G. Trinkley, Child Labor in America:  An Historical Analysis, 13 IN PUB. 
INTEREST 59, 84 (1993). 
 201. Id. at 84–86. 
 202. Id. at 87. 
 203. Id. at 86, 89; see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Courage of Innocence:  
Children as Heroes in the Struggle for Justice, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1569, 1571–72 (citing 
the history of children’s role in labor protests as chronicled in SUSAN CAMPBELL 
BARTOLETTI, KIDS ON STRIKE! 8–12, 27 (1999)). 
 204. See CYNTHIA LEVINSON, WE’VE GOT A JOB:  THE 1963 BIRMINGHAM CHILDREN’S 
MARCH (2012) (presenting interviews with children, some as young as nine, who were 
willing to risk arrest by joining thousands of other students in civil rights protest 
marches in May 1963).  See generally ELIZABETH PARTRIDGE, MARCHING FOR FREEDOM:  
WALK TOGETHER, CHILDREN, AND DON’T YOU GROW WEARY (2009) (recounting 
experiences of elementary and high school students participating in the 1965 
Alabama marches for voting rights); Sam Dillon, Wisdom of Leaders and Guidance for 
Graduates, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2010, at A22 (presenting an excerpt from an address 
by University of Maryland, Baltimore County President Freeman Hrabowski III in 
which he describes the lesson to be drawn from his decision, at age thirteen, to face 
arrest and jail for joining the 1963 Birmingham civil rights demonstrations:  “Even 
children can think critically and make decisions that can affect their lives”).  For a 
comprehensive examination of the rhetorical framing of the crusade for racial 
equality as a fight for black children’s futures and the special role of youth in the 
black freedom struggle from 1940s through the 1960s, see REBECCA DE SCHWEINITZ, IF 
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Parks, fifteen-year-old Claudette Colvin resisted segregation on 
Montgomery, Alabama city buses.205  Colvin refused a bus driver’s 
demand to give up her seat to a white woman when all the seats in 
the white section were filled and was arrested.206  In April, 1951, 
Barbara Johns, a high school junior from Prince Edward County, 
Virginia set in motion the events that would culminate in the 
Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Brown v. Board of Education.207  
Outraged by the stark inequality in conditions in local black and 
white schools, Johns led her fellow students in a walkout from R.R. 
Moton High School208 and then wrote to NAACP lawyers, urging them 
to represent local families in a suit challenging school segregation.209 
Children were also at the forefront of the campaign to vindicate 
the freedom of conscience in American classrooms, securing the end 
of compelled recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance210 and of 
mandatory Bible reading and daily prayer rituals.211  The Supreme 
Court’s docket has consistently included claims pressed by children, 
often effectively, against school practices that threaten students’ First 
and Fourth Amendment rights.212 
                                                        
WE COULD CHANGE THE WORLD:  YOUNG PEOPLE AND AMERICA’S LONG STRUGGLE FOR 
RACIAL EQUALITY (2009); see also DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE CHILDREN (1998), which 
recounts the role black children and youth played in sit-ins, protest marches, and 
civil disobedience actions across the South during the civil rights era. 
 205. See generally PHILLIP M. HOOSE, CLAUDETTE COLVIN:  TWICE TOWARD JUSTICE 
27–35 (2009) (recounting Claudette’s story of her encounter with the police on the 
bus). 
 206. Id. at 29–35.  Colvin’s boldness spurred the city’s black leaders, including 
newly arrived pastor Martin Luther King, Jr., to resolve to confront the daily 
indignities blacks faced on the city bus system.  Id. at 38–41.  Colvin went on to 
become a plaintiff in the successful constitutional challenge to the Alabama statute 
and Montgomery city ordinance mandating bus segregation.  Browder v. Gayle, 142 
F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.), aff’d per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (mem.). 
 207. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:  THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 469–70 (1975). 
 208. Id.; see also BOB SMITH, THEY CLOSED THEIR SCHOOLS:  PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, 
VIRGINIA, 1951–1964, at 38–39 (1965) (describing the nature of the disparity in 
school conditions and Barbara Johns’ rallying of her fellow students). 
 209. KLUGER, supra note 207, at 471; see Verna L. Williams, Reading, Writing, and 
Reparations:  Systemic Reform of Public Schools as a Matter of Justice, 11 MICH. J. RACE & 
L. 419, 420–21 & n.6 (2006) (quoting a portion of the letter written to NAACP in 
which Johns and Carrie Stokes begged for immediate legal assistance so students 
could graduate on time).  The lawsuit, Davis v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 
(E.D. Va. 1952), became one of the four cases resolved in Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 210. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 211. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963); Engel 
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). For a detailed narrative of Ellery Schempp’s decision 
to challenge his Pennsylvania school district, see generally STEPHEN D. SOLOMON, 
ELLERY’S PROTEST:  HOW ONE YOUNG MAN DEFIED TRADITION AND SPARKED THE BATTLE 
OVER SCHOOL PRAYER (2007). 
 212. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) 
(holding school officials’ search of teenage student’s bra and underwear 
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Student dissent also illuminated the difficulties that arose as school 
systems implemented desegregation orders, revealing vestiges of the 
discredited old order and the realities of lingering resistance to 
needed change.213  Such protests did not always find a receptive 
judicial audience even in the immediate wake of Tinker.214 
Students have continued to use a variety of vehicles to deliver what 
are, in effect, petitions for redress of grievances.  Such vehicles 
include editorials in school papers,215 underground publications,216 
and artistic performances.217  Students have expressed their concerns 
about school labor practices218 and the treatment of faculty,219 and 
students continue to object to over-reaching policies regarding the 
                                                        
unconstitutional); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) 
(invalidating policy allowing students to deliver opening prayers at high school 
football games); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (invalidating practice of 
inviting clergy to deliver opening and closing messages at public school graduation 
ceremonies); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 231 (1990) (rejecting school’s 
assertion that complying with Equal Access Act by giving student religious club access 
to school facilities would violate Establishment Clause). 
 213. See Black Voters v. McDonough, 421 F. Supp. 165, 176–77, 183 (D. Mass. 
1976) (noting the history of black student boycotts and white parent and student 
protests as the school district grappled with implementation of busing plan), aff’d, 
565 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Corinth Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 414 F. 
Supp. 1336, 1339 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (characterizing the presence or absence of 
student protest against white administrators as an indicator of how successfully a 
school district was desegregating). 
 214. See, e.g., Tate v. Bd. of Educ., 453 F.2d 975, 976 (8th Cir. 1972) (upholding 
the suspension of twenty-nine black students who exited a school pep rally in “quiet 
procession” to protest playing of “Dixie”); Caldwell v. Craighead, 432 F.2d 213, 215, 
217 (6th Cir. 1970) (upholding the suspension of a black student from the band 
when he declined to play “Dixie” during a pep rally). 
 215. See, e.g., Sommer Ingram, Newspapers Containing Editorial Critical of School’s PE Program 
Confiscated, SPLC (June 18, 2010), http://www.splc.org/news/newsflash.asp?id=2108 
(criticizing school principal for destroying student newspapers because of editorial 
proposing ways to reduce PE costs).  For an examination of how to protect students 
speaking out on controversial issues in their school newspapers, see Tyler J. Buller, 
The State Response to Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (Aug. 15, 2012) (unpublished article), 
available at http://works.bepress.com/tyler_buller/2/. 
 216. See, e.g., Scoville v. Bd. of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 11, 14–15 (7th Cir. 1970) 
(finding that the complaint challenging the expulsion of students for the on-campus 
distribution of an underground newspaper containing criticism of school policies 
and officials demonstrated an unjustified invasion of First Amendment rights). 
 217. See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, A Student Play Blasting N.Y. School Reform is Banned, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2010, 1:41 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/answer-
sheet/school-turnaroundsreform/a-student-play-criticizing-sch.html. 
 218. See Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 530 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(rejecting school’s claim that students’ wearing of “scab” buttons to express 
opposition to use of replacement teachers during teachers’ strike would be 
“inherently disruptive”). 
 219. See Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 173, 176 (9th Cir. 1973) (concluding that 
students could not be disciplined for bringing signs to school to protest school’s 
refusal to renew English teacher’s contract but that the school could take away the 
signs based on forecast of disruption). 
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recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.220  They have protested against 
school uniform policies,221 staged write-in campaigns in opposition to 
limits on who is eligible to be a student government officer,222 
objected to perceived irregularities in ballot counting in a vote on a 
class t-shirt design,223 urged a boycott of a school fund-raising drive,224 
and registered their opposition to school budget cuts.225  School 
discipline policies and their allegedly inequitable or unreasonable 
application have repeatedly drawn student ire,226 and students 
continue to rally on behalf of minority constituencies victimized by 
administrator prejudice.227 
                                                        
 220. See Frazier ex rel. Frazier v. Winn, 535 F.3d 1279, 1281, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 
2008) (per curiam) (rejecting high school junior’s First Amendment challenge to 
Florida statute requiring students to obtain parental permission in order to be 
excused from reciting Pledge); cf. Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 
1252 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether paddling of student who silently raised his fist during daily flag salute was 
motivated by desire to suppress what the teacher and principal viewed as student’s 
supposedly unpatriotic viewpoint). 
 221. See DePinto v. Bayonne Bd. of Educ., 514 F. Supp. 2d 633, 636 (D.N.J. 2007) 
(enjoining the threatened suspension of fifth graders for wearing buttons with words 
“No School Uniforms” and red slashed circle printed over a photograph of 
uniformed Hitler Youth). 
 222. See, e.g., Bull v. Dardanelle Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 745 F. Supp. 1455, 1457–61 
(E.D. Ark. 1990) (rejecting a student’s claim that the rule requiring students seeking 
office to obtain approval from two-thirds of student’s current teachers had been 
applied to retaliate against “outspokenness” but noting that the school had decided 
to amend policy after filing of suit to specify the criteria teachers should use in 
evaluating students and allowing appeals procedures for students denied requisite 
teacher approval). 
 223. See Brandt v. Bd. of Educ., 480 F.3d 460, 462–63, 467 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(rejecting eighth graders’ First Amendment challenge to rule banning clothing with 
“inappropriate word[s] or slogans” as applied to shirts worn to protest perceived 
irregularities in voting to select school t-shirt design). 
 224. See Hatter v. L.A. City High Sch. Dist., 452 F.2d 673, 674–75 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(reversing the district court’s finding that students suspended for distributing 
“Boycott Chocolates” flyers did not address issue of “sufficient social importance” to 
merit First Amendment protection). 
 225. See Garcia v. Yonkers Sch. Dist., 561 F.3d 97, 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2009) (denying 
plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees in light of the district’s voluntary reduction of 
suspension term). 
 226. See, e.g., Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160, 161–63 (2d Cir. 1971) (upholding the 
punishment of a student who participated in sit-in to protest the suspension of three 
classmates); Acevedo v. Sklarz, 553 F. Supp. 2d 164, 167–70 (D. Conn. 2008) 
(rejecting the claim that a student’s suspension and arrest for refusing the principal’s 
demand that he stop filming police officer’s alleged use of excessive force on 
another student in school hallway violated his clearly established First Amendment 
right); Dodd v. Rambis, 535 F. Supp. 23, 30–31 (S.D. Ind. 1981) (upholding a high 
school’s expulsion of students for distributing leaflets urging classmates to stage a 
walk-out to protest discipline policies in light of the disruption caused by a related 
walk-out). 
 227. See Gillman ex rel. Gillman v. Sch. Bd., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1359, 1361, 1379 (N.D. 
Fla. 2008) (invalidating the suspension of a student for violating rule that prohibited 
wearing or displaying symbols or messages urging fair treatment and acceptance of 
persons who are gay; the ban was imposed after the student began to organize a 
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Some student dissenters whose efforts were rebuffed by school 
authorities may have been ahead of their time, urging, for example, 
reluctant school authorities to confront how emerging conceptions of 
gender equality and identity should alter outdated dress code rules.228  
Other student voices have pressed claims exposing resistance to and 
anxiety about societal transitions reflecting an evolving 
understanding of how our constitutional commitment to equal 
protection defines schools’ corresponding legal duties.229 
                                                        
campaign to protest an administrator’s flagrant hostility to gay student and inaction 
against anti-gay bullying). 
 228. See, e.g., Press v. Pasadena Indep. Sch. Dist., 326 F. Supp. 550, 552, 559 (S.D. 
Tex. 1971) (upholding the suspension of an eighth-grade girl who organized a 
march at school protesting rule barring girls from wearing “any type of trouser 
garment”).  Some of the protesting students had worn pantsuits to school.  Id. at 560.  
Plaintiff Sabrina Press marched wearing a maxi dress over a pantsuit, later lending 
the dress to another girl who faced suspension if she did not change out of her 
pantsuit.  Ms. Press initiated the march after collecting a thousand signatures on a 
petition calling for an end to the no-trousers-for-girls rule and submitted the petition 
to the school district, which had refused to change the rule.  Id. at 558; see also 
Complaint Against Rickey Clopton, Copiah County School District, and Ronald 
Greer ¶ 3, Sturgis v. Copiah Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 3:10–CV–455–DPJ–FKB, 2011 WL 
4351355 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 15, 2011) (challenging the school district’s refusal to 
include the plaintiff’s senior portrait in her high school yearbook because she had 
chosen to wear a tuxedo rather than the drape customarily worn by female students).  
Ceara Sturgis and the school reached a settlement, and the suit was dismissed with 
prejudice on May 1, 2012.  Order Dismissing Case, Sturgis v. Copiah Cnty. Sch. Dist., 
No. 3:10–CV–455–DPJ–FKB, 2011 WL 4351355 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 15, 2011). 
 229. See, e.g., Nuxoll ex rel. Nuxoll v. Ind. Prairie Sch. Dist. No. 204, 523 F.3d 668 
(7th Cir. 2008) (finding likelihood of success in a student’s claim that the school 
could not prevent him from wearing “Be Happy, Not Gay” t-shirt to express 
opposition to “Day of Silence” observance in which students and school officials took 
forms of symbolic action to draw attention to harassment and stigmatization of gay 
students); Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding 
no First Amendment violation in the suspension of a student who wore a t-shirt that 
said “BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS 
CONDEMNED” on the front and “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL ‘Romans 
1:27’” on the back; the student asserted that he wore the shirt to express his religious 
belief and to convey opposition to the school’s observance of “Day of Silence”), 
vacated, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007); Crosby ex. rel. Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801, 802 
(4th Cir. 1988) (upholding a Virginia high school principal’s decision to end the use 
of “Johnny Reb” mascot despite objections voiced by some students through a 
petition drive, ribbon-wearing campaign, and statements at school board meetings. 
Principal had taken no disciplinary action against students opposing mascot 
change and had not restricted their expressive activities); Melton v. Young, 465 
F.2d 1332, 1333 (6th Cir. 1972) (upholding the suspension of a student who wore 
Confederate flag emblem on his jacket after the school district, facing ongoing 
racial tension and confrontations between students three years after desegregating, 
discontinued the use of “Dixie” as the school’s pep song and the Confederate flag 
as the school symbol). 
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B. Dismissing the Student Critic:  Errors and Alternatives 
The Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Lowery v. Euverard230 and the Third 
Circuit’s decision in Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard231 offer a 
useful starting place for an examination of the appropriate 
constitutional protection owed student petition and protest activities 
in school.  In both cases, school officials punished or curtailed 
student petition efforts, and reviewing courts upheld the officials’ 
actions.232  By identifying the deficiencies in these opinions and 
noting that alternative analytical approaches have protected student 
speech in similar circumstances, this Section invites consideration of 
how both schools and courts should translate what the Constitution 
demands in such situations. 
1. Demanding unquestioning obedience:  Lowery v. Euverard 
In Lowery v. Euverard, four members of a varsity football team 
drafted and circulated a short, unsophisticated petition that they 
planned to present to the principal as the 2005 season ended.233  The 
petition was not eloquently phrased, stating simply “I hate Coach 
Euvard [sic] and I don’t want to play for him.”234  The boys acted in 
response to what they saw as the head football coach’s abusive, unfair, 
and unproductive treatment of players.235  The drafters and signers, 
eighteen of the team’s thirty-seven players, hoped that the head 
coach would be removed by the school district at the end of the 
season.236  However, when Euverard learned about the petition in 
early October, each player who had signed the petition was led by an 
                                                        
 230. 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 231. 325 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 232. For further discussion of Lowery and Walker-Serrano, see infra Part III.B.1. 
 233. Lowery, 497 F.3d at 585. 
 234. Id.  The brief for Euverard and the other members of the coaching staff 
asserted that, because no specific remedy was sought in the text of the circulated 
document, it should not be treated as a petition.  Final Brief of Defendants 
Appellants Marty Euverard et al. at 9, Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 
2007) (No. 06-6172). 
 235. Lowery, 497 F.3d at 585.  Coach Euverard’s three year record at Jefferson 
County High was 6-13.  Jeff Lockridge, BGA Gains from Euverard Return, TENNESSEAN, 
Mar. 20, 2007, at C.2.  The alleged misconduct included punching players in the 
head, failing to stop other members of the coaching staff from using unnecessary 
force with players, repeatedly humiliating and cursing at the team, tearing up the 
college recruiting letters of players with whom Euverard was displeased, and 
imposing a year-round conditioning program in violation of applicable league rules.  
Final Brief of Defendants Appellants Marty Euverard et al., supra note 234, at 9–10. 
 236. Final Brief of Defendants Appellants Marty Euverard et al., supra note 234, at 
10–14 (noting that a number of players who objected to Euverard’s conduct had 
already quit the team before the petition was circulated and that three prominent 
players, including the starting quarterback, had joined the petition effort).  There 
were no allegations that anyone had been harassed or pressured to sign the petition.  
Id. at 12. 
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assistant coach into an office where, apart from any other students, 
he faced the irate head coach.237  If the player refused to apologize 
and say that he wanted to play for Euverard, the player was dismissed 
from the squad.238  This action threatened to end the students’ high 
school football careers, foreclosing a route from the rural Tennessee 
community to college via an athletic scholarship.239 
 The school’s principal and district officials sided with the coach 
and would not reverse the decision to kick Derrick Lowery, Randy 
Giles, Joseph Dooley, and Dillon Spurlock off the squad 
permanently.240  No investigation of Euverard’s behavior appears to 
have been undertaken by the district.241  Instead, the principal 
reportedly told plaintiff Spurlock that he had been “stupid” to sign 
the petition, saying it was “the wrong way” to address the situation.242  
The players initiating the petition in Lowery had identified 
potentially serious misconduct, worthy of investigation by their school 
system.  Recent headlines raise the specter of coaches engaging in 
sexual or physical abuse of young athletes, conduct that exacts an 
enormous human toll and creates serious legal consequences for the 
schools involved.243  Coaches’ disregard of players’ health by pushing 
practices beyond recommended limits has also prompted public 
concern and legal action.244  Thus, it is not hard to envision 
                                                        
 237. Lowery, 497 F.3d at 586.  The boys who had circulated the petition appeared 
fearful that the encounter with the coaching staff could be physically threatening 
based on the coaches’ prior behavior.  See Final Brief of Plaintiffs/Appellees, supra 
note 234, at 22–23 (recounting incident in which a student was grabbed by the 
throat by an assistant coach, prompting the student to quit the team). 
 238. See Final Brief of Defendants Appellants Marty Euverard et al., supra note 234, 
at 28 (explaining that Euverard “forgave” any players who admitted signing the 
petition and apologized for doing so). 
 239. Jefferson County High was the only public high school serving in the county 
and offered the only high school football program (public or private) in the county.  
Id. at 7.  Two of the four plaintiffs, unable to move or to afford private school, could 
not play again.  Id. at 52. 
 240. Id. at 26–27. 
 241. Id. at 26. 
 242. Id. at 25–26. Speaking with a player’s mother shortly after the players were 
dismissed, the district’s Director of Schools made the following remark:  “You 
probably don’t want to know my ideas on student petitions, do you?”  Id. at 26–27. 
 243. See Jesse McKinley, After Penn State Case, Coaches Face New Scrutiny, N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 15, 2012, at A18 (noting that in the wake of child sexual abuse allegations 
against a former member of Penn State coaching staff, there was a surge of state 
legislative initiatives subjecting youth sports coaches to additional scrutiny before 
hiring, such as criminal background checks, and including coaches among 
mandated reporters of suspected child physical or sexual abuse). 
 244. Football coaches have faced civil and criminal liability when student athletes 
died during summer practices in intense heat.  See, e.g., Kentucky High School Football 
Coach Charged with Reckless Homicide in Player’s Death, FOX NEWS (Jan. 22, 2009), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,481645,00.html.  A jury acquitted the coach 
of both reckless homicide and wanton endangerment charges, but the deceased 
player’s family asserted that the charges had brought about needed changes in 
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circumstances in which student athletes justifiably petition for the 
correction of administrators’ lax oversight of athletic staff. 
Testifying at trial, the students who signed the petition emphasized 
that they wanted to play football for their school; they simply did not 
want to be subjected to the humiliation and abuse Coach Euverard 
had used, very unsuccessfully, to motivate the players.245  Coach 
Euverard claimed at trial that he had not dismissed the players 
because of the petition but because of their insubordinate refusal to 
do what he demanded in the confrontation about the petition.246  
Trial testimony from Euverard and other members of the coaching 
staff confirmed that the students had not refused to follow directions 
during practices or spoken disrespectfully to any member of the 
coaching staff prior to the discovery of the petition.247  The school 
defendants contended that Coach Euverard’s behavior could not be 
questioned without undermining the ability of the football program 
to advance its goal of “the overall development of the student athlete, 
teaching leadership, responsibility and life skills.”248  Dismissively 
characterizing the extension of constitutional protection to the 
students’ petition as what would, in effect, be a “license to be 
insubordinate and discourteous” to school personnel,249 the 
defendant coaches went on to argue, without any apparent sense of 
irony, that protecting the students’ speech and invalidating their 
removal from the team would undermine the school’s recognized 
                                                        
schools’ practice policies.  Jason Riley, Stinson Found Not Guilty in PRP Player’s Death, 
COURIER-J. (Sept. 17, 2009, 11:32 PM), http://www.courier-journal.com/article/20090917 
/SPORTS05/909170320/Stinson-found-not-guilty-PRP-player-s-death; see also School 
District Reaches Agreement in High School Player’s Death, USA TODAY (Sept. 9, 2009, 2:49 
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/preps/football/2009-09-09-montana-death-
settlement_N.htm (reporting that a school district agreed to settle with the parents 
of a seventeen-year-old football player who collapsed and died after practicing during 
intense heat and smoky conditions). Practicing under such weather conditions 
contradicts the recommendations of the National Athletics Trainers Association.  Paul 
J. Weber, Despite Deaths, Schools Resist Changing Heat Plans, FOX NEWS (Sept. 14, 2009), 
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2009Sep14/0,4675,FBHHeatGuideli
nes,00.html; see also Anahad O’Connor, Trying to Reduce Head Injuries, Youth Football 
Limits Practices, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2012, at A1 (describing how youth football 
programs are modifying training in response to evidence of special danger that 
concussions pose for younger players). 
 245. See Final Brief of Defendants Appellants Marty Euverard et al., supra note 234, 
at 16 (noting that team record had been 2–4 before petition had been drafted). 
 246. Id. at 22. 
 247. See Final Reply Brief of Appellants Marty Euverard et al. at 8, Lowery v. 
Euverard, 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-6172) (citing the trial testimony of 
plaintiff Dillon Spurlock that he loved football and wanted to play for Jefferson 
County but did not want to play for Euverard because he had no respect for him). 
 248. Final Brief of Defendants Appellants Marty Euverard et al., supra note 234, 
at 41–42. 
 249. Id. at 42. 
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authority to “teach by example the shared values of a civilized social 
order.”250  
The Sixth Circuit panel opinion proceeded from the premise that 
students’ speech rights would necessarily be constrained because 
“[w]ithout first establishing discipline and maintaining order, 
teachers cannot begin to educate their students.”251  The court 
stressed the following: 
Public schools are necessarily not run as a democracy.  Schools 
exist to provide a forum whereby those with wisdom and 
experience (the teachers) impart knowledge to those who lack 
wisdom and experience (the students).  Unlike our system of 
government, the authority structure is not bottom-up, but top-
down.  The authority of school officials does not depend upon the 
consent of the students.  To threaten this structure is to threaten 
the mission of the public school system.252 
Tinker’s disruption standard had to be adapted to the special 
demands of a high school football program, an environment where 
“execution of the coach’s will is paramount” because the coach 
determines how best to achieve the team’s principal goal of winning 
athletic competitions.253  The petitioning players effectively sought a 
“right to belong to the Jefferson County football team on their own 
terms”254 and sought to establish a “right to unilaterally undertake a 
referendum on the coach’s authority.”  The players, the majority 
reasoned, wanted “a bottom-up authority structure for high school 
athletics,” but “[a] high school athletic team could not function 
smoothly with an authority structure based on the will of the 
players.”255  Concluding the school officials could have anticipated 
that a “material and substantial” disruption would result from the 
petition, the majority held that the school could, under Tinker, 
remove the players based solely on their circulation of the petition.256  
The majority brushed aside the students’ argument that school 
officials had failed to offer specific evidence of actual or foreseeable 
disruption, reasoning that concepts like team morale and unity are 
                                                        
 250. Id. at 43 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)). 
 251. Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 589 (quoting Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1190 (6th 
Cir. 1995)). 
 254. Id. at 589. 
 255. See id. at 591.  The majority contrasted the events at issue in Lowery with 
circumstances in which student athletes’ communication of grievances could be 
protected, such as when a coach had “put his authority into play.”  Id. (citing Pinard 
v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 467 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2006)).  For further discussion of 
Pinard, see Part III.B.2. 
 256. Lowery, 497 F.3d at 591–92. 
BROWN.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2013  1:37 PM 
2012] INSIDE VOICES 293 
not quantifiable, despite their important impact on a team.257  
Returning to the opinion’s central theme and with no apparent 
unease about defending Coach Euverard’s claimed entitlement to the 
students’ unquestioning obedience, the court elaborated: 
The success of an athletic team in large part depends on its coach.  
The coach determines the strategies and plays, and “sets the tone” 
for the team.  The coach, particularly at the high school level, is 
also responsible for providing “an educational environment 
conducive to learning team unity and sportsmanship and free from 
disruptions and distractions that could hurt or stray the 
cohesiveness of the team.”  . . . The ability of the coach to lead is 
inextricably linked to his ability to maintain order and discipline.  
Thus, attacking the authority of the coach necessarily undermines 
his ability to lead the team . . . .  Plaintiffs’ circulation of a petition 
stating “I hate Coach Euvard [sic] and I don’t want to play for 
him” was a direct challenge to Euverard’s authority, and 
undermined his ability to lead the team.  It could have no other 
effect.258   
To bolster its conclusion that Tinker offered no protection for the 
players’ petition, the majority drew parallels between school officials’ 
concerns and those of a public employer facing a disgruntled 
employee.259  Comparing the athletes’ claims to those of government 
workers and drawing on the principles laid out in the then-
controlling Supreme Court public employee speech precedents, 
Pickering v. Board of Education260 and Connick v. Myers,261 the majority 
found a further flaw in the students’ claim.262  Their speech failed to 
address what the court would classify as a matter of public concern.263  
Despite the underlying accusations of bullying and misuse of power 
levied by the players against Euverard, their petition did not 
represent a “whistleblower situation.” 264 
Concurring in the result on the ground that school officials could 
properly claim qualified immunity due to the lack of clearly 
                                                        
 257. Id. at 593. 
 258. Id. at 594.  The court then speculated that the petitioning players might try to 
increase the likelihood that the school district would fire Euverard by playing poorly, 
producing losses for their team and sowing divisions among players as losses 
mounted.  Id. at 594–95. 
 259. Id. at 597.  The Lowery majority, however, saw the speech of student athletes 
as less likely to be protected than that of public employees given the closely 
supervised, highly regulated status of high school team members and the voluntary 
character of sports participation.  Id. at 600. 
 260. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 261. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 262. Lowery, 497 F.3d at 597–99. 
 263. Id. at 598 n.5. 
 264. Id. at 600. 
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established law addressing similar facts, Judge Gilman sharply 
criticized the majority’s treatment of the students’ First Amendment 
claims.265  To Judge Gilman, school officials had not, as Tinker 
required, shown a reasonable basis for anticipating substantial 
disruption of or material interference with school activities.266  In 
addition, he objected vigorously to “grafting” a public concern 
requirement onto the Tinker formula, potentially narrowing the 
protection afforded student speech.267 
2. Probing for retaliatory motive:  Pinard v. Clatskanie School District 6J 
Cataloguing the majority opinion’s deficiencies in Lowery, Judge 
Gilman called attention to the fact that the court had declined to 
follow the Ninth Circuit’s persuasive analysis of very similar claims in 
Pinard v. Clatskanie School District 6J.268  In Pinard, members of an 
Oregon high school varsity basketball team faced abusive treatment 
from their coach.269  While berating the students for poor play, the 
coach had presented this choice:  They could either quit the team or 
ask for his resignation and he would go.270  The team co-captains then 
called a meeting at which all players attending, with the exception of 
the coach’s son, decided to draft a petition seeking the coach’s 
resignation.271  The boys delivered the petition to the coach the next 
day at school, and he immediately brought it to the school principal 
and the district superintendent.272  The principal advised the coach 
not to resign at that time, and the superintendent proposed meeting 
with the players to get more information about the situation.  Saying 
                                                        
 265. Id. at 601, 606 (Gilman, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 266. Id. at 601. 
 267. Id. 
 268. 467 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 269. The players alleged that the coach, Jeff Baughman, subjected them to 
physical intimidation, slapping and hitting them, as well as tirades laced with 
profanity and demeaning taunts.  Id. at 760. 
 270. Id. at 760 n.6. 
 271. Id. at 760.  The petition read as follows: 
As of February 12, 2001, the Clatskanie Tigers Boys Varsity Basketball 
Team would like to formally request the immediate resignation of Coach 
Jeff Baughman.  As a team we no longer feel comfortable playing for him 
as a coach.  He has made derogative [sic] remarks, made players 
uncomfortable playing for him, and is not leading the team in the right 
direction.  We feel that as a team and as individuals we would be better off 
if we were to finish the season with a replacement coach.  We, the 
undersign [sic], believe this is in the best interest of the team, school, 
town, and for the players and fans.  We would appreciate the full 
cooperation of all the parties involved. 
Id. at 760–61.  Under their signatures the players typed the following:  “[W]e will not 
be approached individually on this. This was a team decision and we will be 
addressed as a team.”  Id. at 761. 
 272. Id. 
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he felt “upset and hurt” by the petition, the coach asked for and 
received permission to take the rest of the day off.273 
After leaving the school the coach called another member of the 
coaching staff, telling him that he “wanted to know who his back-
stabbers were” and that he planned “to corner the little sons-of-
bitches and not give them an out.”274  The coach reported that the 
principal had responded to the petition by offering two options:  He 
could resign or he could “tell the players to either get on the bus and 
play or if they chose not to board the bus to turn in their 
uniforms.”275  The coach claimed that the principal and school 
athletic director urged him to pursue the second option. 
The principal met with the players, who stated that they would not 
want to continue to play if the coach remained in charge.276  The 
principal advised the team members that an investigation would have 
to be conducted before the coach could be removed.  The players 
were told they could either take part in a mediation to be conducted 
by the principal and athletic director and play for the school that 
night or, if they declined to enter mediation, forfeit the privilege of 
playing in the game.277  The players did not remember being told that 
they would be suspended from the team if they refused to play that 
night, and the principal could not recall giving such a warning.278  
The students were not told that the coach had informed the principal 
he did not want to coach the game and that a replacement coach had 
been enlisted.279  Believing that Jeff Baughman, the coach, would be 
at the game, the petitioning players decided not to participate.280  
With junior varsity players as replacements, the team suffered a 50 
point loss.  The signers later testified that they would have played had 
they known Baughman would not be there.281 
Meeting the next day with the signers’ parents, the principal 
informed them that their sons were permanently suspended from the 
team for not attending the game.282  After appealing the sanction to 
                                                        
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. at 762 & n.8. 
 279. Id. at 762. 
 280. Id.  One signer, a team co-captain whose father was the school’s assistant 
athletic director, decided to participate in the game. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id.  The school’s Code of Conduct and Appearance for Athletes stated that 
athletes “will travel to and from contests with coach and team” unless specifically 
given permission not to do so and authorized that “an athlete may be disciplined for 
conduct termed detrimental to the team and/or school.”  Id. at 762 n.11.  The 
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the school board, which upheld the principal’s decision, the students 
filed suit in federal district court asserting that they had been 
punished for exercising their First Amendment rights.283  The district 
court granted the school district’s motion for summary judgment, 
finding that the players’ petition was not constitutionally protected 
because it did not address a matter of public concern and instead 
resembled the unprotected private grievance of an employee, lacking 
any “political dimension.”284  Offering an alternative ground for the 
summary judgment grant, the district court reasoned that the 
students’ speech had “substantially and materially interfered with a 
school activity” and could therefore be punished even if it would 
otherwise be considered protected speech.285 
Reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit found that the 
players’ petition and the complaints they presented about the coach 
in their meeting with school administrators were “pure speech.”286  
Relying on Tinker, the panel reasoned that the players could only be 
punished if the officials could cite facts forming a reasonable basis for 
forecasting that the petition would cause “substantial disruption of or 
material interference with school activities.”287  The panel emphasized 
that Tinker supplied the relevant framework for analyzing student 
speech that is not school-sponsored and that is not lewd, vulgar, 
obscene, or plainly offensive.288  The panel further emphasized that, 
unlike public employee speech precedents, Tinker did not require 
students to address a matter of public concern to merit First 
Amendment protection.289  Having shown no reasonable basis for 
projecting that the students’ presentation of the petition and their 
meeting with the principal and school athletic director would cause 
disruption or harm others in the school, school officials could not 
punish the petitioning students.290  Although acknowledging that 
students’ refusal to play in the evening game might be considered 
                                                        
school district later cited the Code as the basis for the players’ suspension, but the 
principal, who had made the suspension decision, admitted he was not familiar with 
its provisions.  Id. at 762. 
 283. Id. at 763. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 764. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 765. 
 289. Id.  The court did note, however, that because the players complained about 
“the school’s performance of its duties to supervise its teachers, monitor 
extracurricular activities and provide a safe and appropriate learning environment 
for its students,” they did address “matters of public concern,” had that been the 
relevant standard.  Id. at 767 n.18. 
 290. Id. at 768. 
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expressive conduct subject to First Amendment protection, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the refusal or “boycott” did materially 
interfere with the school’s athletic program and could justify the 
students’ suspension under Tinker.291  Nonetheless, the panel saw the 
factual record as “not sufficiently clear” as to whether the students’ 
refusal to play was in fact what prompted their suspension.292  The 
school officials had failed to tell the players that the coach would not 
be at the game even though the officials could anticipate the coach’s 
absence might alter the players’ decision to sit out the game.293  That 
omission suggested that the officials might be using the players’ 
refusal to play as a pretext, attempting to conceal that the boys were 
suspended in retaliation against their protected petitioning activity.294  
The Ninth Circuit therefore remanded the case for the district court 
to examine the retaliatory motive question.295 
The students prevailed on remand, defeating the school district’s 
motion for summary judgment.296  Examining only the question of 
whether school officials had demonstrated that the suspensions 
would have been imposed even if the students had not complained 
about the coach in their petition, the district court found that the 
evidence did not support the district.297  The court looked at the 
timing of the suspension, school officials’ expressed opposition to the 
students’ speech, and other evidence that the claimed disruption of 
the game was used as a pretext to conceal a retaliatory response to 
the students’ complaints.298  The proximity in time between the 
presentation of the petition and the suspension supported the 
inference that the players were suspended, at least in part, for their 
speech.299  Because the principal had told the petitioning players that 
he supported the coach, his offer to serve as a mediator of the 
dispute presented the boys with a “Hobson’s choice,” precipitating 
their boycott of the game and making the petition activity and the 
boycott an undivided continuum of events rather than separable 
incidents.300  The choice presented to the players appeared designed 
to “goad or trick [them] into sanctionable behavior” that they might 
                                                        
 291. Id. at 769. 
 292. Id. at 770. 
 293. Id. at 768. 
 294. Id. at 770. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, No. 03-172-HA, 2008 WL 410097, at *6 
(D. Or. Feb. 12, 2008). 
 297. Id. at *5. 
 298. Id. at *3–4. 
 299. Id. at *3. 
 300. Id. 
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not have undertaken had they been properly informed.301  Perhaps 
most significantly, the court found that the coach, whose conduct was 
the focus of the students’ complaints, appeared to have had the 
ability to influence, perhaps even determine, the principal’s response 
to the students’ complaints.  When the petition was presented, the 
principal had been a candidate for district superintendent, and the 
coach was one of three members of an applicant screening 
committee.302  The principal’s eagerness to acquire or maintain the 
coach’s support for his candidacy could foreseeably have altered his 
response to the students’ grievances, making a retaliatory reaction 
more plausible. 
3. Underestimating the young critic:  Walker-Serrano ex rel. 
Walker v. Leonard 
In early February 1999, third grader Amanda Walker-Serrano tried 
to gather signatures from her classmates on a handwritten petition 
that presented this appeal: “We 3rd grade kids don’t want to go to the 
circus because they hurt animals.  We want a better feild [sic] trip.”303  
Looking to inform other students at Lackawanna Trail Elementary 
about how circuses mistreat performing animals and to persuade 
them to join her in asking school officials to change the planned 
April trip to the Shriners Circus, Amanda had taken her petition onto 
the playground at recess, garnering thirty signatures the first day she 
brought it outside.304  The next day, according to the school district’s 
account, a teacher saw a group of children gathered around Amanda.  
The group was near a patch of ice, and, as the teacher approached to 
investigate what they were doing, she encountered a crying child who 
had slipped on the ice.305  Although the child’s fall may have had no 
connection to Amanda’s activities, the teacher admonished Amanda, 
saying, “you can’t have that here.”306  The school district contended 
that this remark was an expression of concern that the writing 
implements used to sign the petition could lead to injuries on the 
slippery playground.307  A teacher also reported observing children 
coming to Amanda’s desk to talk to her during daily quiet reading 
time, and, seeing the petition on Amanda’s desk, had concluded that 
                                                        
 301. Id. at *6. 
 302. Id. at *4. 
 303. Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard (Walker-Serrano II), 325 F.3d 412, 414 
(3d Cir. 2003). 
 304. Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard (Walker-Serrano I), 168 F. Supp. 2d 
332, 335 (M.D. Pa. 2001), aff’d, 325 F.3d 412. 
 305. Walker-Serrano II, 325 F.3d at 414. 
 306. Walker-Serrano I, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 335. 
 307. Walker-Serrano II, 325 F.3d at 414 n.1. 
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the children were speaking to Amanda about it rather than doing 
their schoolwork.308  According to the school district, after the 
principal learned about the petition, she told teachers they should 
advise Amanda that she was prohibited from circulating the petition 
on school grounds.309   
When Amanda’s parents’ contacted the school board president to 
complain about the principal and teacher stopping her from 
circulating the petition, the school district’s counsel sent them a 
letter which revealed that the district saw petitioning as an unsuitable 
activity for elementary school children: “Elementary schools are not 
generally the environment for petition circulation, particularly where 
parents are totally unaware of such activities.  It is incumbent upon 
school authorities, particularly in an elementary school setting, to 
preserve an appropriate environment focused on the institution’s 
instructional objectives.”310  Amanda’s parents would later point out 
that a social studies textbook used by her class specifically suggested 
that, as a learning exercise, students could “circulate a petition on a 
matter of community concern.”311 
In a second letter, the district’s lawyer seemed to offer a 
different explanation of why Amanda’s signature gathering had 
been shut down:  her failure to submit her petition for prior 
review by school officials.312  Amanda’s parents alleged that the 
prior review policy was only invoked as a post hoc justification for 
stopping her petition activities and contended that the cited policy 
had not been enforced.313   
                                                        
 308. Walker-Serrano I, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 336. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id.  Educational research has, in fact, contradicted this view.  See Ethel 
Sadowsky, Taking Part:  Democracy in the Elementary School, in PREPARING FOR 
CITIZENSHIP:  TEACHING YOUTH TO LIVE DEMOCRATICALLY 151, 151–64 (Ralph Mosher 
et al. eds., 1994) (describing children’s effective advocacy in elementary school 
community meetings); Clarissa Sawyer, Democratic Practices at the Elementary School 
Level:  Three Portraits, in PROMISING PRACTICES IN TEACHING SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 87, 
87–103 (Sheldon Berman & Phyllis LaFarge eds., 1993) (describing successful 
experiments that gave students significant input into and responsibility for classroom 
and school governance at the elementary and secondary level). 
 311. Walker-Serrano II, 325 F.3d at 418. 
 312. The cited district policy, Policy 220, stated the following: 
The Board shall require that students who wish to distribute materials 
submit them for prior review.  Where the reviewer cannot show within two 
school days that the materials are unprotected, such materials may be 
distributed . . . .  The Superintendent shall develop rules and regulations 
for the distribution of printed material which shall include:  procedure for 
the prior review of all materials to be distributed. 
Walker-Serrano I, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 336–37. 
 313. Id. at 337.  The Walker-Serranos had asserted that the school had allowed a 
pro-circus petition to be circulated without any prior review, but the trial court noted 
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A few days before the circus trip, the school did allow Amanda to 
give her classmates stickers and coloring books that criticized 
circuses’ cruelty to performing animals.314  She did not go on the trip 
and stood with her mother in protest outside the circus venue.315  
While standing with her mother, Amanda faced teasing from some 
students from her school, including a group of boys who yelled “kill 
the animals” and “torture the animals.”316 
Amanda’s experience drew local media attention.  In late February, 
an editorial in the Scranton Tribune offered an acerbic assessment of 
the school’s reaction to the petition, writing as follows: 
Here in America, the international guardian of democracy, the last 
thing on earth we would want our public schools to do is 
encourage children to think for themselves and embrace 
democratic principles . . . .  Whether circus animals are poorly 
treated is a matter of intense debate around the country.  One 
would think that an educational institution would find a way to 
examine such an issue raised by a student instead of, in effect, 
telling her to shut up.317  
Reviewing courts displayed less sympathy for Amanda’s First 
Amendment claims.  The district court held that Amanda’s right to 
circulate her petition must be clearly established to overcome the 
school officials’ qualified immunity defense.318  The court noted that 
it had identified no cases specifically analyzing an elementary school 
student’s constitutional right to petition at school and evaluated 
Amanda’s claim by consulting the broader universe of student speech 
cases.319  The district court found that the age of Amanda and her 
classmates created a basis for distinguishing her case from cases 
upholding the First Amendment rights of high school students to 
distribute literature on campus.320  Looking at Amanda’s actions and 
her principal’s and teachers’ responses, the court saw the officials as 
heeding Tinker’s admonition that they “must be able to show that 
                                                        
that they had “presented no evidence that school officials were aware of the 
existence of another petition.”  Id. at 346. 
 314. Id. at 344. 
 315. Id. at 337. 
 316. Id.  The case record does not indicate whether the boys were disciplined. 
 317. Lynn Manheim, Amanda Walker-Serrano, in SPEAKING OUT FOR ANIMALS:  TRUE 
STORIES ABOUT REAL PEOPLE WHO RESCUE ANIMALS 215, 216 (Kim W. Stallwood ed., 
2001).  An editorial cartoon was also spotlighted the controversy.  It depicted a little 
girl holding a document labeled “First Amendment” in one hand and a paper 
labeled “Circus Petition” in the other.  She faced a ringmaster, wearing a jacket 
saying “Lacka. Trail Elem.” and armed with a bullwhip as he wielded a chair in an 
apparent effort to fend off the child.  Id. 
 318. Walker-Serrano I, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 341. 
 319. Id. at 342. 
 320. Id. at 341. 
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[their] action was caused by something more than a mere desire to 
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an 
unpopular viewpoint.”321  In the court’s view, the officials had acted 
reasonably to prevent disruption in the classroom and potential 
injury on the playground, and their reactions did not reflect hostility 
to her anti-animal cruelty message given that she had the opportunity 
to pass out the stickers and coloring books and had not been formally 
punished.322  The opinion did not address the implications of 
recognizing Amanda’s speech activities as a criticism of school 
officials’ field trip choices—a characterization that could have 
triggered more careful exploration of the motivation behind the 
school personnel’s reaction to Amanda’s activities. 
The district court did recognize, however, the right of juveniles to 
petition the government under the First Amendment.323  The court 
concluded that Amanda’s right to petition had been satisfactorily 
respected by allowing the child’s position to be presented to the 
school board by her parents and by authorizing the distribution of 
the stickers and coloring books to her classmates although the latter 
are a non-governmental audience.324  Because the court viewed the 
student’s petition right as encompassed within her speech rights, her 
expression could be restricted in accordance with Tinker’s anti-
disruption rationale.325 
Upholding the district court’s ruling, the Third Circuit panel 
opinion stressed that “the First Amendment has never been 
interpreted to interfere with the authority of schools to maintain an 
environment conducive to learning.” 326  The panel observed that the 
balance between students’ First Amendment rights and schools’ need 
for order must reflect special sensitivity to the age and maturity of the 
students involved, drawing on prior rulings in which the youth and 
impressionability of students justified restricting speech about human 
sexuality, as in Fraser, or limiting the distribution of religious 
literature.327  The panel opinion conceded that elementary students 
had what were described as “qualified Tinker right[s]” but viewed 
those rights as generally “very limited” for third graders.328 
                                                        
 321. Id. at 344 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 509 (1969)). 
 322. Id. at 344–46. 
 323. Id. at 346. 
 324. Id. at 347. 
 325. Id. at 342, 344. 
 326. Walker-Serrano II, 325 F.3d 412, 416 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 327. Id. at 416–17. 
 328. Id. at 417. 
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Turning to Amanda’s invocation of First Amendment protection 
for the circulation of her petition, the panel confronted longstanding 
precedent treating efforts to collect signatures on a petition as “the 
type of interactive communication concerning political change that is 
appropriately described as ‘core political speech.’”329  The panel did 
not tackle the challenge of clarifying the exact contours of 
elementary students’ rights to engage in this form of political 
advocacy but refused to articulate a per se rule that such political 
advocacy would never be appropriate.330  Citing the fact that she was 
not punished and that she was given permission to distribute anti-
circus stickers and coloring books, the panel saw no hostility to 
Amanda’s substantive position in the school officials’ response to her 
petition.331  The panel concluded that the school’s response 
represented a constitutionally acceptable effort to avoid disruptions 
in the classroom and on the playground and to prevent her 
classmates’ rights from being infringed.332 
In a concurring opinion that sought to express his skepticism 
about Amanda’s claimed “First Amendment right to collect 
signatures on a petition and thus have her fellow eight- or nine-year-
old third grade students join her protest,”333  Judge Greenberg 
asserted the following: 
[I]t will be a rare case in which such conduct should be protected 
when the signatures are sought from children as young as those 
involved here, particularly in a school setting.  I think that it is 
unlikely that the third grade children here could have had 
knowledge of how a circus treats its animals.  After all, I have no 
such knowledge myself.  Yet Amanda induced more than 30 of 
them to sign a petition that they did not want to go to the circus 
because it “hurt[s] animals.”  Of course, I recognize that even 
adults will sign petitions without understanding the issues involved 
and in doing so likely will be protected constitutionally, as will be 
the persons circulating the petitions.  But the status of adults differs 
from that of children at school as in general public officers and 
agencies have no obligation to protect adults from their own 
conduct or the importuning by other persons.334 
                                                        
 329. Id. at 418 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421–22 (1988)). 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. at 419. 
 332. Id. (treating the curtailment of Amanda’s petition activities as simply the 
school’s effort “to regulate the times and circumstances a petition may be circulated 
in order to fulfill its custodial and pedagogical roles”). 
 333. Id. at 420 (Greenberg, J., concurring). 
 334. Id. 
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Deriding the view that “it is never too early for a person to learn to 
challenge authority,” Judge Greenberg connected his concerns to 
Tinker’s “rights of others” reservation and expressed apprehensions 
about an eight- or nine-year-old feeling pressured to sign a petition.335  
The judge also anticipated that parents might view elementary school 
petitions as an incursion on their parental prerogatives, writing that 
“parents do not send their children, particularly young children, to 
school in order for them to be solicited to state their opinions on 
matters of public concern or school administration.”336  In his view, it 
is not appropriate to solicit the signatures of third grade children on 
a petition asking them to state their views without the advice and 
consent of the children’s parents.337 
In contrast, Judge Fullam, a district judge sitting by designation, 
wrote separately to distance himself from his colleagues’ disparaging 
appraisal of the capacity of Amanda and her classmates to form and 
express a protectable perspective on the circus trip.338  Rather than 
questioning Amanda’s right to circulate her petition, Judge Fullam 
focused only on whether, in light of a distinct likelihood of 
disruption, school officials could impose reasonable time, place, and 
manner restrictions on her activities, a more demanding standard 
that he believed could still support the district court’s ruling.339 
The Third Circuit panel opinion in Walker-Serrano interpreted the 
fact that Amanda was not punished for her petitioning as effectively 
negating any inference that school officials had any improper, 
censorial motive.340  School officials did, however, block her efforts to 
speak to her classmates about the petition in order to seek their 
signatures, thereby frustrating her classroom First Amendment 
experiment.341  Under these circumstances, the absence of 
punishment mitigates but does not eliminate the First Amendment 
injury.  Amanda’s expressive objectives included communicating her 
own views about circuses’ mistreatment of animals, seeking to 
persuade her classmates to share her position, and joining with 
likeminded classmates to ask that school officials offer a field trip that 
                                                        
 335. Id. at 421. 
 336. Id. at 420. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at 421 (Fullam, J., concurring). 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. at 419 (majority opinion); cf. Emily Gold Waldman, Regulating Student 
Speech:  Suppression Versus Punishment, 85 IND. L.J. 1113 (2010) (arguing that when 
student speech triggers punishment school officials should be required to show that 
they provided adequate prior notice of the rule invoked and of the potential 
sanction and that the punishment imposed was reasonable). 
 341. Walker-Serrano II, 325 F.3d at 414. 
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did not involve supporting the objectionable circus enterprise.  By 
appealing to her classmates to join her in voicing their concern for 
the circus animals and objecting to the school’s chosen field trip, was 
Amanda interjecting ideas that were unsuitable and disturbing for 
young children?  Was she threatening the ability of her classmates’ 
parents to protect them from inappropriate influences?  Or was she, 
to the alarm of school officials, introducing her fellow students to the 
idea that they could identify an injustice—the infliction of physical 
and emotional harm on confined wild animals—and challenge what 
the children saw as a bad decision by school officials to support that 
injustice?  Allowing Amanda to distribute the stickers and coloring 
books appears to negate the first two posited explanations for the 
school officials’ actions, making the disquieting third option most 
plausible and most consistent with the view first expressed by the 
school district that elementary schools are inappropriate settings for 
petition activities.342 
4. Experiencing citizenship in the classroom:  Downs v. Conway 
School District 
Just as Pinard preserved a place for student petition activity in the 
high school setting, Downs v. Conway School District,343 a case decided 
shortly after Tinker, illustrates that petitioning for redress of 
grievances can be affirmed as a vital, constructive part of an 
elementary school student’s education for citizenship.  In Downs, a 
second grade teacher had been dismissed after she and her young 
pupils sought several changes in school operations.344  In the first 
incident, the teacher gave the principal drawings some of her 
students had made in art class.  The children had been instructed to 
draw their classmates, conveying what they were feeling.  Several 
students drew pictures of other children lying down, asking for water.  
Others drew wilted flowers.  These images expressed the children’s 
frustration that their water fountain had been broken for many 
weeks.345  Later, after studying about food and nutrition, a student 
proposed writing a letter to the cafeteria supervisor asking for raw 
rather than cooked carrots in order to maximize the nutritional value 
                                                        
 342. See Walker-Serrano I, 168 F. Supp. 2d 332, 336 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (discussing the 
district counsel’s letter, which stated: “Elementary schools are not generally the 
environment for petition circulation, particularly where parents are totally unaware 
of such activities. It is incumbent upon school authorities, particularly in an 
elementary school setting, to preserve an appropriate environment focused on the 
institution’s instructional objectives”). 
 343. 328 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 
 344. Id. at 342. 
 345. Id. at 339–42. 
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of their school lunches.  A class workbook had suggested an initiative 
as part of the curriculum unit.346  Members of the class prepared and 
signed a simple letter and asked for the teacher to sign with them, 
which she did.347  The letter was mailed to the cafeteria supervisor but 
also drew the attention of the superintendent.  During the period in 
which her students were voicing their concerns about their water 
fountain and their cafeteria fare, Ms. Downs had repeatedly 
complained to her principal and superintendent about the health 
and safety hazard posed by the operation of an open burning 
incinerator, which stood in the center of the school playground and 
ran throughout the school day.  The incinerator emitted smoke, 
which sickened children and adults in the school, including Ms. 
Downs and some of her second graders.  In addition, dangerous 
debris fell from the incinerator.  Some children would be drawn to 
these burned and rusted materials, and others would sometimes try 
to ignite sticks or branches by inserting them into the incinerator 
during recess.  Citing this series of events as instances of 
“insubordination,” “lack of cooperation with the administration,” 
and “teaching second graders to protest,” the school board, acting 
on the basis of the superintendent’s recommendation, refused to 
renew the teacher’s contract and ended her more than twenty-five 
years as, in her principal’s description, “a master teacher.”348  To 
support his recommendation, the superintendent had invoked a 
Board of Education policy forbidding the circulation of petitions 
without the approval of the school superintendent.349 
Reviewing Ms. Downs’ First Amendment challenge to her dismissal, 
the district court observed that “the superintendent demanded blind 
obedience to any directive he gave whether illegal, unconstitutional, 
arbitrary or capricious,” ignoring the legitimate character of all of 
the complaints and the orderly and restrained manner in which they 
were conveyed.350  Allowing the teacher to be fired under these 
circumstances would, the court concluded, threaten the school’s 
ability to credibly convey an appreciation of basic constitutional 
principles.351  Furthermore, the school district’s own policies exhorted 
its teachers to “demonstrate the principles of democracy at all times 
in the operation of [their] classroom[s;] thereby providing each child 
with the opportunity to develop from actual experience a real 
                                                        
 346. Id. at 341. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. at 342. 
 349. Id. at 346. 
 350. Id. at 343, 346. 
 351. Id. at 350 (citing text of the Board of Education’s District Policy III.F.4e). 
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understanding of the democratic way of life.”352  Consequently, the 
court ruled that the school district could not dismiss a teacher simply 
because she and her students sought to remediate problems at their 
school.353  The court saw through the purported justifications used to 
obscure the superintendent’s real motivation for firing Ms. Downs—
his desire to squelch all criticism about his failure to ensure a safe 
and healthy school environment.354 
C. The Heightened Hazards of Overly Restrictive Reactions:  The 
Implications of Pearson and Garcetti 
The outcomes in Lowery and Walker-Serrano were not inevitable 
under available precedent and should not be treated as the 
appropriate balancing of student rights and institutional needs.  The 
significance of these flawed rulings extends beyond the litigants and 
students in the school districts within the relevant judicial circuits. 
Although contrary precedent offering protection of similar student 
expression exists, the Supreme Court’s recently revised qualified 
immunity jurisprudence increases the likelihood of repressive 
responses to students’ controversial or critical speech.  In Pearson v. 
Callahan,355 the Supreme Court abandoned the analytical sequence 
prescribed by Saucier v. Katz356 as the template for the evaluation of 
officials’ claims of qualified immunity from personal liability in cases 
alleging violations of constitutional rights.357  Saucier’s protocol 
required a court to first examine whether the facts alleged or shown 
by the plaintiff made out a constitutional violation and then, if such a 
violation was found, to discern if the right had been clearly 
established when the challenged official conduct occurred.358  
Liability could be imposed only when the right asserted is “clearly 
established,” a standard that the Court has explained will not be met 
in the absence of confirming precedents from the controlling 
jurisdiction at the time of the challenged conduct or “a consensus of 
cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable [official] could 
not have believed that his actions were lawful.” 359  A circuit split on 
the relevant constitutional question would also rebut the assertion 
                                                        
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. at 348. 
 354. See id. at 346 (identifying the “real cause of friction” as the plaintiff’s 
criticism of the superintendent). 
 355. 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
 356. 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
 357. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. 
 358. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 
 359. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999). 
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that a right was clearly established.360  The Court has recognized, 
however, that “a general constitutional rule already identified in the 
decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct 
in question” even without a prior ruling specifically addressing the 
practice at issue.361  
The Saucier sequence reflected concern that “were a court simply 
to skip ahead to the question whether the law was clearly established” 
the elaboration of constitutional principles could be thwarted.362  
Although noting that the Saucier two-step process “promote[d] the 
development of constitutional precedent,” the unanimous Pearson 
Court yielded to complaints from lower courts about the expenditure 
of scarce judicial resources on difficult interpretive questions that 
could have no effect on the actual outcome of a case against officials 
and concluded that lower courts should have the discretion to 
dispense with Saucier’s first prong.363  This option, attractive to lower 
courts straining under heavy caseloads, foreseeably inhibits the 
correction of officials’ misunderstandings of the nature of 
constitutional protections. 
In Pearson’s wake, rulings like Lowery and Walker-Serrano allow 
school officials to reasonably project that they will be shielded from 
personal liability when they react repressively to student petition and 
protest activity at school.364  With the liability disincentive removed, 
school officials may see little downside to firmly and swiftly shutting 
down student challenges to policies and practices students identify as 
unfair or dysfunctional. 
Acknowledging students as a potentially vital source of 
information about school efficacy and fairness makes facilitating 
and protecting student speech a necessary component of school 
accountability and improvement.  Like teachers, students can offer 
an insider’s perspective on school life.  The imperative to create and 
maintain mechanisms for students to present school-related 
grievances acquires particular urgency due to the shadow the 
Supreme Court’s current approach to the protection of public 
                                                        
 360. Id. at 618. 
 361. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740–41 (2002) (citing United States v. Lanier, 
520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997)). 
 362. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 
 363. Id. 
 364. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Cases Will Face New Hurdles, A.B.A. J. 
(Feb. 1, 2012, 8:50 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_new 
_hurdles_for_civil_rights_cases (describing how, to overcome a qualified immunity 
defense, the Supreme Court has begun requiring a case on point that demonstrates 
that the Plaintiff’s right was clearly established when violated). 
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employee speech has cast over teachers’ willingness to air 
complaints about school operations.365 
Under the analysis articulated in Garcetti v. Ceballos, “when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the 
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline.”366  Continuing to retreat 
from the quality of First Amendment protection once available to 
public employees speaking on “matters of public concern,” such as 
possible governmental misconduct,367 Justice Kennedy concluded in 
Garcetti that a Los Angeles County deputy district attorney could not 
challenge allegedly retaliatory actions taken by his supervisors after a 
memorandum recommending the dismissal of criminal charges in 
light of irregularities in the procurement of a key search warrant.368 
Although some teachers’ First Amendment retaliation claims 
stemming from complaints about problematic school practices or 
administrator wrongdoing have survived in the post-Garcetti era,369 
                                                        
 365. For assessments of the risks that Garcetti creates for teachers and other school 
employees who voice concerns about school practices, see Richard T. Geisel & 
Brenda R. Kallio, Employee Speech in K–12 Settings:  The Impact of Garcetti on First 
Amendment Retaliation Claims, 251 EDUC. L. REP. 19, 20 (2010); Martha M. McCarthy & 
Suzanne E. Eckes, Silence in the Hallways:  The Impact of Garcetti v. Ceballos on Public 
School Educators, 17 IN PUB. INTEREST 209 (2008); and Susan P. Stuart, Citizen Teacher:  
Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t, 76 U. CINN. L. REV. 1281, 1321–42 (2008).  For 
an examination of Garcetti’s impact in the special education context, see Gina K. 
DePietro & Perry A. Zirkel, Employee Special Education Advocacy:  Retaliation Claims 
Under the First Amendment, Section 504 and the ADA, 257  EDUC. L. REP. 823 (2010), 
noting that teachers and other school employees may be able to obtain relief under 
provisions of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA) that confer protection from retaliation on persons attempting to protect 
the rights of people with disabilities. 
 366. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
 367. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569–70 (1968). 
 368. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.  Garcetti’s reasoning has been widely criticized.  See 
Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983:  A Critique 
of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2008) (describing how Garcetti 
“under-protects public employee speech that is vital to self-government”); Helen 
Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech:  Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to 
Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 4, 31 (2009) (arguing that Garcetti leaves public 
employees unprotected when they report safety hazards, ethical lapses, and other 
government misconduct and should only be used to limit the free speech protections 
of employees hired to convey specific viewpoints that are clearly recognizable as 
“governmental in origin”); Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment 
Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 117, 117 (2008) 
(concluding the ruling makes “it nearly impossible for conscientious public servants to 
speak out in the best interests of the public without jeopardizing their careers”). 
 369. See, e.g., Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1206 
(10th Cir. 2007) (finding that teachers spoke as citizens addressing matters of public 
concern when, as part of meetings with parents and other members of the public, 
they discussed how a charter school’s code of employee conduct limited employees’ 
speech and associational rights and whether the school’s charter would be renewed); 
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many others, including claims arising from the identification of 
potentially serious misconduct or the failure to meet legal obligations 
to vulnerable students, have been doomed by the application of 
Garcetti.370  Until Garcetti is reconsidered or refined,371 teachers’ efforts 
to expose school dysfunction will remain a hazardous enterprise few 
may be bold enough to undertake.372 
                                                        
Corbett v. Duerring, 780 F. Supp. 2d 486, 489, 493 (S.D. W. Va. 2011) (finding that a 
vice principal’s allegations that he was pressured to apply lenient discipline to 
children of “persons of influence” was the speech of a citizen on a matter of public 
concern when he made the remarks during a protest while suspended from office); 
Sherrod v. Sch. Bd., 703 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1298 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (finding that a 
teacher’s repeated appearances before the school board to address the district’s 
deficient implementation of statutorily mandated inclusion of African and African-
American history in the social studies curriculum could qualify as citizens’ speech on 
a matter of public concern because the teacher testified about district policy matters 
beyond the scope of his teaching duties and spoke as parent and taxpayer), rev’d per 
curiam on other grounds, 667 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 370. See, e.g., Massaro v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., No. 11-2721-CV, 2012 WL 
1948772, at *2 (2d Cir. May 31, 2012) (finding that a teacher’s complaints about 
sanitary conditions and a potential health hazard in a shared classroom arose out of 
her duties as an employee, precluding First Amendment protection); Fox v. Traverse 
City Area Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 605 F.3d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that a 
teacher’s complaint to supervisors that the size of her teaching caseload prevented 
her from providing appropriate services to special education students was not 
protected by the First Amendment because it was made as part of her performance 
of teaching responsibilities); Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 
2010) (concluding that a fifth grade teacher’s filing of union grievance about the 
principal’s failure to discipline a student who threw a book at the teacher in a 
classroom was unprotected under Garcetti because it addressed conditions related to 
the teacher’s essential instructional duties); Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 
F.3d 689, 694 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (ruling that a school athletic director’s 
memos seeking information about money missing from an athletic account were not 
protected under the First Amendment because they addressed matters related to his 
job duties); Condiff v. Hart Cnty. Sch. Dist., 770 F. Supp. 2d 876, 889 (W.D. Ky. 2011) 
(reasoning that a teacher’s report of an allegation that another teacher sexually 
harassed her step-daughter was not entitled to First Amendment protection because 
the teacher, as part of her job duties, was obligated under the school sexual 
harassment policy to relay any such allegations to the school administration);  Morey 
v. Somers Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 06 Civ. 1877(PGG), 2010 WL 1047622, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 19, 2010) (deciding that a head custodian’s complaints to the district 
administrators about possible asbestos contamination in a high school gym were 
unprotected because they were made in furtherance of his core employment 
responsibilities), aff’d, 410 F. App’x 398 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 371. See Lyle Denniston, Free Speech Issue Bypassed, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 27, 2012, 12:23 
p.m.), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/02/free-speech-issue-bypassed/ (noting that 
by denying certiorari petitions seeking review of Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 
2011), cert denied, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012), and Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011), reh’g denied, 653 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1636 
(2012), the Court evaded opportunities to reconsider the reach of Garcetti). 
 372. Teachers in some areas may be able to invoke the protection of state 
whistleblower laws when they seek to expose problems in schools.  See Brenda R. 
Kallio & Richard T. Geisel, To Speak or not to Speak:  Applying Garcetti and 
Whistleblower Laws to Public School Employee Speech, 264 EDUC. L. REP. 517, 531–32 
(2011) (describing variable scope of such state laws and identifying procedural 
prerequisites, such as the presentation of the issue to a supervisor, that may inhibit 
teachers’ use of this mode of protection). 
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IV. MAKING ROOM FOR STUDENT DISSENT AT SCHOOL 
When school officials and reviewing courts regard student speech 
seeking change at school as a threat to the accomplishment of the 
instructional mission, they ignore both the educational opportunity 
offered by this kind of student dissent and its constitutional value.  To 
counteract this repressive reflex, this Article presents two 
recommendations.  First, schools must be persuaded to reframe their 
understanding of their instructional mission.  To educate children 
for citizenship, the essential objective of a civics curriculum, schools 
should ensure that their instructional program includes a 
participatory dimension.  Second, courts should reinforce schools’ 
adherence to a properly articulated civic education agenda by 
applying more rigorous scrutiny to schools’ attempts to suppress or 
punish student dissent seeking change in school policies or practices. 
A. New Norms for Educators:  Adopting a Capabilities Approach, Assuming 
a Fiduciary Role 
Given the consistent emphasis on the added value of including a 
participatory component in schools’ civic education program, the 
analysis of student dissenters’ invocation of First Amendment 
protection might be constructively reshaped by drawing on Martha 
Nussbaum’s capabilities-oriented approach to the interpretation of 
constitutional rights.373  Anchored in a commitment to respecting the 
dignity of each person, the Capabilities Approach presses an 
exploration of what people are “able to do and to be” and the 
attendant investigation of what social and political obligations should 
properly be enforced in order to offer each person sufficient 
opportunity to achieve her human potential.374  A Capabilities 
Approach invites careful attention to how constitutional principles 
and their interpretation have promoted or impeded people’s abilities 
to function in some central areas of human life, asking, “[d]oes the 
interpretation of constitutional entitlements yield real abilities to 
choose and act, or are the constitution’s promises more like hollow 
verbal gestures?”375  In Nussbaum’s account, the normative essence of 
the Capabilities Approach, although recently ignored by Roberts 
                                                        
 373. Martha C. Nussbaum, The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Foreword:  Constitutions 
and Capabilities:  “Perception” Against Lofty Formalism, 121 HARV. L. REV. 4, 56–95 
(2007) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities].  For a sustained 
exploration of the content of a Capabilities Approach and its implications in the 
formation of public policy, see generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING 
CAPABILITIES:  THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT APPROACH (2011). 
 374. Nussbaum, Constitutions and Capabilities, supra note 373, at 5–6. 
 375. Id. at 6. 
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Court majorities, has animated judicial reasoning and advanced 
constitutional understanding in some of the Supreme Court’s most 
significant and controversial rulings.376  Evaluating the respective 
constitutional prerogatives of the student critic and school officials 
through the lens of a Capabilities Approach could clarify what is at 
stake when student dissent is stifled. 
In recent work with Rosalind Dixon, Professor Nussbaum has 
identified how adopting a capabilities-oriented analytical approach 
could improve the understanding of children’s rights claims.377  
Dixon and Nussbaum clarify how recognizing specific rights for 
children might be justified so as to demonstrate appropriate 
sensitivity to children’s needs and vulnerabilities as well as their often 
overlooked capacity for agency.378  Dixon and Nussbaum draw on 
Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit’s explanation of the concept of 
corrosive disadvantage to explain why children’s rights claims should 
be afforded special priority.379  Wolff and de-Shalit identify what they 
label as corrosive forms of disadvantage which both inflict present 
damage and precipitate other capability failures in the future.380  
Dixon and Nussbaum focus on how certain forms of material 
deprivation, such as malnutrition, could subject children to corrosive 
disadvantage by undermining their physical health and mental 
development—outcomes inconsistent with respect for the dignity of 
children as persons.381  Dixon and Nussbaum then project the future 
hazards this kind of children’s disadvantage could create for the 
larger society in which they live when, for example malnourished 
children’s impaired cognitive development threatens to diminish 
their future employability and their ability to perform their civic 
responsibilities, such as voting.382 
Denying children participatory and expressive opportunities in 
school could create problematic citizenship skills deficits for 
children.  Such deficits threaten children both in their present and 
                                                        
 376. Id. at 56–73 (explaining how the Courts’ rulings in cases such as Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202 (1982), Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 
254 (1970), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954), reveal the implicit adoption of a Capabilities Approach). 
 377. Rosalind Dixon & Martha C. Nussbaum, Children’s Rights and a Capabilities 
Approach:  The Question of Special Priority, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 553 (2012). 
 378. Id. at 553. 
 379. Id. at 580. 
 380. JONATHAN WOLFF & AVNER DE-SHALIT, DISADVANTAGE 121 (2007).  Wolff and 
de-Shalit contrast “corrosive disadvantages” with “fertile functionings,” abilities that, 
once acquired or developed, establish a foundation for the acquisition of other 
desirable skills or attributes.  Id. at 138. 
 381. Dixon & Nussbaum, supra note 377, at 580–81. 
 382. Id. at 582–83. 
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future lives, thwarting their acquisition of a civic voice and depleting 
their motivation to participate in collective problem-solving.383  For 
children living in historically disenfranchised and neglected 
communities, opportunities to express concerns and to affect change 
at school may be particularly critical.  Such opportunities offer a 
glimpse of a responsive civic world and sustain students’ faith in the 
possibility of democratic governance384 and in their own capacity to 
act as agents of reform.385 
Moreover, short-circuiting students’ efforts to challenge perceived 
inequity or dysfunction at school could inhibit rather than enhance 
institutional functioning in at least two ways.  First, if school officials 
exhibit a reflexively repressive response when students question 
them, these officials fail to conform to constitutional democracy’s 
expectation that authority can be subject to challenge and that those 
wielding authority should answer such challenges by presenting 
reasoned justifications rather than insisting on automatic 
deference.386  This potentially alienates students from their school 
and undermines their faith in public institutions.387  Second, simply 
shutting down student dissent by equating such speech with 
unacceptable disruption also cuts off access to the information 
resource students represent.388  Students are an underutilized source 
of “critical local knowledge,”389 and their aired concerns and 
grievances offer data about both a school’s climate and practices. 
                                                        
 383. MEIRA LEVINSON, NO CITIZEN LEFT BEHIND 192, 197–98 (2012) [hereinafter 
LEVINSON, NO CITIZEN]. 
 384. Id. at 195. 
 385. Id. at 226 (noting the power of such experiences in counteracting too 
frequently propagated images of low income students of color as “bundles of deficits 
who traumatize the community via academic failure, idleness, and even criminal 
delinquency;” such images distort both the broader society’s view of such youth and, 
perhaps even more tragically, such youths’ view of themselves). 
 386. See Constance A. Flanagan et al., School and Community Climates and Civic 
Commitments:  Patterns for Ethnic Minority and Majority Students, 99 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 
421, 422, 428–29 (2007) (arguing that “young people’s confidence in the system 
occurs via the accumulated experience of fair (due) process and responsive 
interactions with adult authorities,” and subsequently, “[t]he kinds of public spaces 
our schools and communities provide and the behaviors of adults in those settings 
communicate to the younger generation what it means to be part of the body politic 
and to what extent principles of inclusion, fairness and justice figure in that 
process”). 
 387. See William A. Galston, Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic 
Education, 4 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 217, 220 (2001) (describing young people’s lack of 
confidence in “public institutions whose operations they regard as remote, opaque, 
and virtually impossible to control”). 
 388. See supra Part II (discussing how free exchange among students can benefit 
school officials and other students). 
 389. LEVINSON, NO CITIZEN, supra note 383, at 227 (citation omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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Invigorating the protection of student dissent at school would also 
be a part of an overdue effort to integrate children into operative 
regimes of political accountability.  As Ethan Leib and David Ponet 
have explained, democracies’ failure to grapple with children’s status 
as the “orphans of political theory” undermines governmental 
credibility and legitimacy.390  Although repeatedly affirming their 
commitment to principles of inclusion and representation, 
constitutional democracies such as the United States persistently 
evade the challenge of translating those principles into practice for 
children. 
Leib and Ponet propose that fiduciary principles could yield new 
insights into the practical demands of such governmental 
commitments.391  Charged to act in the beneficiaries’ best interest, a 
fiduciary must “actively seek to understand what the beneficiary 
herself prioritizes” and adhere to a “dialogic imperative.”392  
Although able to draw on relevant experience and expertise in 
making decisions affecting the beneficiary, the fiduciary must exhibit 
respect for beneficiary interests and preferences, and such respect 
will be best manifested in “a true willingness to listen and be 
responsive” to the beneficiary’s views.393  Stepping beyond 
“perfunctory consultation,” the fiduciary should actually talk with the 
beneficiary, maintaining an attitude of sincere openness to what can 
be learned from what the beneficiary says.394  The fiduciary must 
“actively work[] to discover, investigate, and engage” the 
beneficiary’s preferences.395  This process may not ultimately require 
conforming to the beneficiary’s preferred course, but it nonetheless 
establishes a foundation of earned trust.396  Leib and Ponet describe 
this duty as one of “deliberative engagement” and use it as the 
guidepost for political reform to realize children’s citizenship.397  
They specifically recommend that governments create mechanisms to 
facilitate this kind of authentic exchange with children and identify 
the use of institutional ombudsmen as one such viable mechanism.398  
                                                        
 390. Ethan J. Leib & David L. Ponet, Fiduciary Representation and Deliberative 
Engagement with Children, 20 J. POL. PHIL. 178, 178 (2012). 
 391. Id. at 179. 
 392. Id. at 180 (using “dialogic imperative” to mean a public servant’s duty to 
enter into dialogue with child-beneficiaries in order to discern their views and 
preferences). 
 393. Id. at 180, 189–90. 
 394. Id. 
 395. Id. at 180. 
 396. Id. at 185–86. 
 397. Id. at 190. 
 398. Id. at 192–98. 
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In this role the ombudsman would have “affirmative duties to talk to 
children and create deliberative fora to engage them.”399 
Applying Leib and Ponet’s conceptual model to the public school 
context reveals the immanent fiduciary character of the roles of 
teachers and administrators with regard to their students’ developing 
constitutional capacities, including their capacity to dissent as they 
identify injustice and call for the correction of governmental 
dysfunction.  In order for students to exercise and cultivate their 
capabilities as dissenters, schools should create and preserve channels 
for student expression, including student petition and protest, and 
courts should protect such expression through the application of 
appropriately tailored legal standards. 
Adopting a more dissent-receptive approach would reflect an 
aspiration to create what Philip Cook has described as “the just 
school.”400  Cook finds flaws in what he describes as a liberal view of 
how schools should treat children, a view that focuses on the child as 
future adult, as well as in what he describes as the liberationist view of 
children, which can mistakenly regard the child as being the same as 
an adult.401  Cook argues that what is owed children as a matter of 
justice cannot be properly assessed by treating the experience of 
childhood only in terms of its instrumental value to the children’s 
future adulthood.402  The significance of schools’ effects on children’s 
present lives should not be overlooked, and an appreciation of 
childhood as “a stage of development that includes a political 
dimension” requires careful scrutiny of how schools treat children.403 
While in school, children engage in what should be recognizable as 
political relations with other children and with adults at school—
adults who, in public schools, act on behalf of the state.  As they 
interact with their peers and supervising adults, children are 
undertaking political practices and exploring what relevant values, 
such as fairness and accountability, demand at school.  The 
encounters and exchanges with others at school constitute what Cook 
terms a “dynamic relationship;” children are guided and influenced 
by the adults around them, and children potentially influence the 
                                                        
 399. Id. at 194; see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Enhancing Children’s 
Participation in Policy Formation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 751, 754–59 (2003) (describing 
strategies for involving children and youth in the development and implementation 
of government policies affecting them). 
 400. Philip Cook, The Just School 1, 3, 29–44 (Econ. & Soc. Research Council, 
Working Paper, Grant Ref. RES-000-22-3228), available at http://www.esrc.ac.uk/my-
esrc/grants/RES-000-22-3228/outputs/read/686f6ea8-1b7b-4a64-9b0e-df7cca6a3c7e. 
 401. Id. at 10. 
 402. Id. at 6. 
 403. Id. at 11. 
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adults and other children in the school, contributing to “their own 
progressive moral development” and to the improvement of the 
shared community.404  These interactive exchanges should, Cook 
counsels, be conducted with sensitivity to children’s emergent 
capabilities, including their capacity for moral agency, and children’s 
simultaneous vulnerabilities as they progress toward maturity.405  The 
reality of these vulnerabilities for children generally at certain stages 
of development and for specific children due to their individual 
circumstances creates the need for adult supervision, guidance, and, 
at times, discipline and the imposition of limitations.406  However, 
appropriate responses to children should be grounded in knowledge 
about the children involved and in respect for children as persons.  
Cook calls for recognition of the school as a “child-specific political 
institution,”407 and argues that the school should be obligated to 
“serve the political interests of children qua children by providing the 
freedoms, resources, and opportunities for children to engage in 
political relations with other children and adults, free from threats of 
harm to those political relations.”408  Denying the child opportunities 
to air grievances and concerns and to have the experience of 
receiving a respectful and reasoned response at school would be an 
example of such a threat. 
B. Reframing Schools’ Instructional Agenda to Protect the Student Critic:  
Civic Education’s Participatory Imperative 
Amidst increasing concern about youth disengagement from 
politics and demonstrated deficiencies in public school students’ 
knowledge about the rudiments of our constitutional system,409 
renewed attention has recently been directed at constructing an 
effective civic education agenda for America’s public schools.410  In 
                                                        
 404. Id. 
 405. Id. at 11–12. 
 406. Id. at 15.  Constraints can therefore be properly imposed on children when 
they lack required competencies or when they want to pursue activities associated 
with documented long-term harms to themselves or others, harms that the children 
cannot reliably weigh or mitigate. 
 407. Id. at 32. 
 408. Id. at 44. 
 409. See, e.g., THE NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, INST. OF EDUC. SCI., CIVICS 2010:  
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS AT GRADES 4, 8, AND 12, at 8 (2011), 
available at http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/main2010/2011466.pdf 
(reporting that only 27% of fourth grade students performed at or above the 
Proficient level in 2010 testing and only two percent earned Advanced scores). 
 410. See generally CAMPAIGN FOR THE CIVIC MISSION OF SCHS., GUARDIAN OF 
DEMOCRACY:  THE CIVIC MISSION OF SCHOOLS (2011), available at http://civicmission.s3 
.amazonaws.com/118/f0/5/171/1/Guardian-of-Democracy-report.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 17, 2012) [hereinafter GUARDIAN OF DEMOCRACY REPORT] (providing policy 
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their influential report, The Civic Mission of Schools, the Carnegie 
Corporation, and the Center for Information and Research on Civic 
Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE) stress the unique and critical 
role public schools play in preparing youth to perform the duties of 
citizenship but bemoan the dramatic narrowing of civic education 
offerings.411  Schools increasingly offer only a course that addresses 
government in abstract terms “with little explicit discussion of a 
citizen’s role.”412 
Citing the cultivation of civic skills and attitudes as a primary 
impetus for the creation of our public school system,413 the 
Carnegie/CIRCLE report underscores that among all public 
institutions, “schools are the most systematically and directly 
responsible for imparting citizen norms.”414  Schools shape students’ 
attitudes, beliefs, and habits as citizens most powerfully through their 
daily practices.  The “models of civic community” students encounter 
at school trigger foreseeable responses: “[Students] learn when to 
stay quiet and how to fly under the radar, and they learn when—and 
with whom—they can speak up.” 415  Inspired by John Dewey’s 
educational ethos,416 schools can serve as civic laboratories where 
students test out their own understandings of citizenship while 
                                                        
recommendations and best practices in civic learning).  The report was prepared by 
the Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools in partnership with the Leonore 
Annenberg Institute for Civics of the Annenberg Public Policy Center at the 
University of Pennsylvania, the National Conference on Citizenship, the Center for 
Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement at Tufts University, 
and the American Bar Association Division for Public Education. 
 411. CARNEGIE CORP. OF N.Y. & CIRCLE:  CTR. FOR INFO. & RESEARCH ON 
CIVIC LEARNING & ENGAGEMENT, THE CIVIC MISSION OF SCHOOLS 12–16 (2003), 
available at http://www.civicyouth.org/PopUps/CivicMissionofSchools.pdf  
[hereinafter CARNEGIE/CIRCLE REPORT]. 
 412. Id. at 14. 
 413. Id. at 11.  The CARNEGIE/CIRCLE REPORT notes that many state constitutions 
explicitly link the provision of public education with preparation for the 
responsibilities of citizenship.  See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“A general diffusion 
of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and 
liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the 
promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement”); IND. 
CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“Knowledge and learning, generally diffused throughout a 
community, being essential to the preservation of a free government; it shall be the 
duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual, 
scientific, and agricultural improvement; and to provide, by law, for a general and 
uniform system of Common Schools . . . .”); MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (“The 
stability of a republican form of government depending upon the intelligence of the 
people, it is the duty of the legislature to establish a general and uniform system of 
public schools.”). 
 414. CARNEGIE/CIRCLE REPORT, supra note 411, at 12. 
 415. LEVINSON, NO CITIZEN, supra note 383, at 175. 
 416. John Dewey conceptualized the public school as “a miniature community, an 
embryonic society.”  JOHN DEWEY, THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY & THE CHILD AND THE 
CURRICULUM 18 (1990). 
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assessing how the adults at school translate the meaning of 
citizenship and governance. 
The Carnegie/CIRCLE Report then projects a capacity-building 
and practice-oriented agenda for civic education that will enable 
students “to be competent and responsible citizens throughout their 
lives.”417  To set the agenda for a revitalized program of civic 
education, the report offers this inventory of relevant attributes and 
capacities for “[c]ompetent and responsible citizens”: 
[They] are informed and thoughtful.  They have a grasp and an 
appreciation of history and the fundamental processes of American 
democracy; an understanding and awareness of public and 
community issues; an ability to obtain information when needed; a 
capacity to think critically; and a willingness to enter into dialogue 
with others about different points of view and to understand 
diverse perspectives.  They are tolerant of ambiguity and resist 
simplistic answers to complex questions.   
[They] participate in their communities.  They belong to and 
contribute to groups in civil society that offer venues for Americans 
to participate in public service, work together to overcome 
problems, and pursue an array of cultural, social, political, and 
religious interests and beliefs.   
[They] act politically.  They have the skills, knowledge, and 
commitment needed to accomplish public purposes—for instance, 
by organizing people to address social issues, solving problems in 
groups, speaking in public, petitioning and protesting to influence 
public policy, and voting.   
[They] have moral and civic virtues.  They are concerned for the 
rights and welfare of others, are socially responsible, willing to 
listen to alternative perspectives, confident in their capacity to 
make a difference, and ready to contribute personally to civic and 
political action.  They strike a reasonable balance between their 
own interests and the common good.  They recognize the 
importance of and practice civic duties such as voting and 
respecting the rule of law.418 
The work of civic education advocates and the research of scholars 
who have examined the components of civic education initiatives 
consistently confirm that an effective instructional program should 
include a participatory dimension.419  A passive, inculcative approach 
to citizenship education that offers students only abstract civics 
                                                        
 417. CARNEGIE/CIRCLE REPORT, supra note 411, at 10. 
 418. Id. 
 419. See id. at 16 (identifying the creation of opportunities for students to 
participate in school governance as among the most promising approaches to 
civic education). 
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lessons or a purely observational perspective on citizens’ critical 
engagement with government will likely be less effective in fostering 
students’ “will and skill” to play an active role in civic life.420  
Moreover, an educational environment that gives adolescents an 
experience of efficacy when they participate in school life has been 
identified as a significant predictor of whether U.S. students report 
that they expect to vote as an adult.421  This kind of school experience 
may be particularly important for students from economically and 
socially disadvantaged communities and from constituencies with a 
history of political disempowerment.422 
Establishing more avenues for students to participate in school 
governance and institutional improvement would track the trajectory 
of international human rights law’s effort to redefine the nature of 
governmental obligations to children and the content of children’s 
citizenship.  Moving beyond initial efforts to establish governmental 
duties to provide for and to protect children,423 Article 12 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child explicitly 
endorses affording children opportunities to participate in 
governance.424  Although the United States has not ratified the 
                                                        
 420. See James Youniss et al., What We Know About Engendering Civic Identity, 40 AM. 
BEHAV. SCIENTISTS 620, 620 (1997) (confirming that students whose education has 
included a participatory component, such as involvement in student government or 
service learning activities, are more likely to exhibit a civic identity characterized by 
“individual and collective senses of social agency, responsibility for society, and 
political-moral awareness”).  See generally JAMES YOUNISS & MIRANDA YATES, COMMUNITY 
SERVICE AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN YOUTH:  THEORY AND POLICY (1997) (exploring 
the nexus between community service and construction of adolescent self-identity); 
Miranda Yates & James Youniss, Community Service and Political-Moral Identity in 
Adolescents, 6 J. RES. ON ADOLESCENCE 271 (1996) (employing empirical analysis to 
prove how community service affects students’ development of civic identity). 
 421. Judith Torney-Purta & Jo-Ann Amadeo, A Cross-National Analysis of Political 
and Civic Involvement Among Adolescents, 36 POL. SCI. & POL. 269, 271 (2003). 
 422. See PETER LEVINE, THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY:  DEVELOPING THE NEXT 
GENERATION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS 131 (2007) (noting the positive impact of 
increased civic knowledge among students in schools with poor educational 
outcomes); LEVINSON, NO CITIZEN, supra note 383, at 175 (emphasizing that students 
inevitably model and practice the norms exhibited by their schools, whether positive 
or negative). 
 423. See Mary John, Voicing:  Research and Practice with the ‘Silenced,’ in CHILDREN IN 
CHARGE:  THE CHILD’S RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING 3, 3–6 (Mary John ed., 1996) 
(describing how recognition of children’s participatory rights during revision of the 
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child reflected an evolving understanding of 
children as citizens rather than as only dependent members of a society). 
 424. Article 12 reads as follows:  “States Parties shall assure to the child who is 
capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all 
matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in 
accordance with the age and maturity of the child.”  U.N. Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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Convention,425 its provisions offer a valuable affirmation of the 
necessity of adding a participatory dimension to our understanding 
of children’s constitutional rights.426 
To demonstrate a commitment to offering students opportunities 
to practice the skills of citizenship, schools must welcome student 
perspectives on problems facing the school community.  Adopting 
such a receptive stance may not inevitably result in the adoption of 
students’ preferences or recommendations as school policy, but it will 
greatly enhance the legitimacy of official decision-making.  Such 
receptivity encompasses making a place for student petition and 
protest within a participatory civic education model, a proposition 
endorsed by retired Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 
who has been at the forefront of the campaign for the revitalization 
of public schools’ efforts to prepare students for the responsibilities 
of citizenship.427 
In a 2009 speech to a joint session of the Florida legislature, shortly 
after Florida had enacted legislation mandating that civics education 
begin in middle school, Justice O’Connor emphasized public schools’ 
vital role in preparing youth for citizenship: 
Self-government, which we have enjoyed in this country, cannot 
survive unless people—our citizens—are willing to get engaged 
and understand the commitments necessary to make democracy 
work.  It was for that very reason that public schools were created in 
this country in the first place:  to produce citizens who have the 
knowledge and the skills and the values to sustain our form of 
government, our democracy.428  
                                                        
 425. See David M. Smolin, A Tale of Two Treaties:  Furthering Social Justice Through 
the Redemptive Myths of Childhood, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 967, 983 (2003) 
(describing proffered explanations for U.S. reticence to ratify the Convention).  Of 
the UN member states, only the United States and Somalia have not ratified the 
Convention.  Id. at 973 n.11. 
 426. See generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Constitutionalization of Children’s 
Rights:  Incorporating Emerging Human Rights Into Constitutional Doctrine, 2 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1, 2 (1999) (describing the constructive influence of the U.N. Convention 
on the Rights of the Child on constitutional development across the globe but 
acknowledging doctrinal and political barriers to incorporating understanding of 
children’s rights expressed in the Convention into American constitutional law). 
 427. See Alexander Heffner, Former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor on the 
Importance of Civics Education, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com 
/lifestyle/magazine/former-supreme-court-justice-sandra-day-oconnor-on-the-importance 
-of-civics-education/2012/04/10/gIQA8aUnCT_story.html (reporting Justice 
O’Connor’s launch of iCivics, a Web-based education project); Seth Schiesel, Former 
Justice Promotes Web-Based Civics Lessons, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2008, at E7 (describing 
Justice O’Connor’s work with Georgetown University Law Center and Arizona State 
University, to develop the Our Courts website (www.ourcourts.org) with interactive 
civics curriculum for middle school students). 
 428. Sandra Day O’Connor, Sandra Day O’Connor on Civics Education, J. JAMES 
MADISON INST., Spring/Summer 2009, at 14–15. 
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She then described civics education as an opportunity to teach 
students how to improve their own communities, adding “it’s about 
teaching students that one person can ignite political fires on the 
ground, and those fires almost always begin with a very small 
spark.”429  Significantly, Justice O’Connor specifically praised the 
efforts of Florida schoolchildren who, after learning about the Tinker 
ruling through a civic education program, took aim at a problem 
within their own school, staging a silent protest in the school cafeteria 
in order to confront school officials about the poor quality of school 
lunches.430  Justice O’Connor applauded the students’ initiative as the 
“kind of engagement and proactive spirit [that] is exactly what civics 
education is all about.”431 
As Justice O’Connor’s praise for the Florida schoolchildren’s 
protest initiative suggests, the most effective education in 
constitutional citizenship will go beyond the more traditional 
transmission of relevant historical and political knowledge and have 
an active, perhaps even confrontational, participatory component.  As 
the Carnegie/CIRCLE report prescribed, to offer effective 
preparation to citizenship schools should “structure the school 
environment and climate so that students are able to ‘live what they 
learn’ about civic engagement and democracy.”432  To do this, schools 
should create outlets for students to speak out about school 
conditions and practices and offer students opportunities to see how 
school policies are made.433 
School officials may be less than enthusiastic about 
recommendations urging “meaningful student participation in 
school governance,”434 foreseeing the creation of channels for 
students to air concerns and complaints about how the school 
operates.  Such apprehensions may explain why descriptions of 
possible modes of participation have gravitated toward familiar and 
often limited forms of student involvement, such as student council 
activities.  This reticence to offer students opportunities to address 
problems arising in their classrooms, in their school, or in their 
school district regrettably ignores research linking such opportunities 
and the sense of personal efficacy they engender with students’ 
                                                        
 429. Id. 
 430. Id. at 16. 
 431. Id. 
 432. CARNEGIE/CIRCLE REPORT, supra note 411, at 21. 
 433. Id. 
 434. See GUARDIAN OF DEMOCRACY REPORT, supra note 410, at 33, 43 (identifying 
student participation in school governance as a proven practice that enhances the 
effectiveness of civic education programs). 
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positive forecasts of their future civic involvement.435  Moreover, when 
school officials resist creating outlets for students to air grievances 
and concerns, they ignore the valuable informational resource 
students’ observations about school functioning can provide436 and 
they slight students’ genuine desire to contribute to school 
improvement efforts.437 
Somewhat perplexingly, those calling for a reinvigorated program 
of civic education that includes participatory opportunities have not 
yet addressed a potentially controversial and challenging question:  
How schools’ responses to student petition and protest that take aim 
at school policies and practices could enhance or potentially detract 
from the effective transmission of the practical demands of 
constitutional commitments.  This Article responds to that omission 
and examines the elements of the constitutional analysis courts 
should use to review schools’ restriction or punishment of this kind 
of student dissent. 
C. Revising the Applicable Legal Standard 
Courts’ deferential review of school officials’ decisions to restrict or 
even punish student expression has led some scholars to draw an 
alarming parallel between the limited protection of student speech in 
                                                        
 435. CARNEGIE/CIRCLE REPORT, supra note 411, at 27; see also Constance A. 
Flanagan & Nakesha Faison, Youth Civic Development:  Implications of Research for Social 
Policy and Programs, 15 SOC. POL’Y REP., no. 1, 2008, at 3–5 (explaining that students’ 
civic identities are rooted in their opportunities for civic involvement). 
 436. See Sam Dillon, What Works in the Classroom?  Ask the Students, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
11, 2010, at A15 (presenting findings of a Gates Foundation study showing that 
surveying students on teachers’ ability to keep order, maintain student interest, and 
help students learn from mistakes provided assessments of teacher effectiveness that 
closely tracked data from standardized test results); see also LEVINSON, NO CITIZEN, 
supra note 383, at 224–30 (describing “action civics” initiatives undertaken by 
programs such as the Mikva Challenge, the Hyde Square Task Force, and the 
Philadelphia Student Union in which high school students identified a community 
issue, conducted research, developed advocacy strategies, and prompted significant 
changes in policy); Elizabeth Armstrong, Project 540:  Students Seeking More than a 
Revolution, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 28, 2003, at 12 (describing civics education 
initiatives at 250 U.S. high schools in which students generate action plans for school 
and community improvement). 
 437. See, e.g., Celina Su, “Where Youth Have an Actual Voice”:  Teenagers as Empowered 
Stakeholders in School Reform, in GASTON ALONSO ET AL., OUR SCHOOLS SUCK:  STUDENTS 
TALK BACK TO A SEGREGATED NATION ON THE FAILURES OF URBAN EDUCATION 143, 143–
75 (2009) (describing effective student mobilizations to secure changes in school 
policies regarding the subsidies for low-income students’ public transportation costs, 
the provision of guidance counselors, and the use of force by school-based police); 
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., VIRGINIA STUDENTS SPEAK OUT (2007), available at 
http://www.virginia-organizing.org/sites/default/files/Obstacles2Opportunity-Final.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 17, 2012) (presenting results from student group’s survey of district’s 
high school population regarding “opportunity gaps” inhibiting academic success of 
low income students, students with disabilities, students of color, and ESL learners). 
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schools and the sharply curtailed speech prerogatives of prisoners 
and members of the military.438  Although this Article has argued that 
such deference is not inevitably prescribed by relevant Supreme 
Court precedent, a new articulation of the legal standard courts 
should apply when analyzing schools’ authority to curtail student 
petition and protest could greatly enhance the effective protection of 
student dissent.  
If the expression of dissent and the presentation of grievances are 
core prerogatives of constitutional citizenship, courts reviewing 
students’ claims for First Amendment protection of petition or 
protest activity at school must seriously consider the implications of 
limiting students’ exercise of such prerogatives in an environment 
putatively charged with providing citizenship education.  To deflect 
such claims, school officials should have to identify legitimate 
differentiating characteristics of the student speakers or conditions in 
the distinct institutional context—the school—to justify speech 
limitations.  Such justifications have, however, frequently been 
broadly framed, taking the form of the categorical assertion, as in 
Walker-Serrano, that students as a group lack the maturity, judgment, 
or intellectual capacity either to levy valid criticisms or complaints 
about school operations or to present such claims in a manner that 
does not needlessly harm others.439  Another generalized defense has 
been the claim, accepted in Lowery, that countenancing such student 
speech would, as a general predictive matter, be more likely to 
undermine respect for school officials’ authority than to have a 
constructive impact on school functioning.440 
If reviewing courts identified an obligation to scrutinize the 
restriction or punishment of student dissent so as to discourage a 
reflexively repressive response by school officials, such officials would 
expect to have to present carefully articulated, situation-specific 
explanations of why limitations of student dissent, petition, and 
protest could not be reconciled with daily school activities.  In 
addition, school officials would be required to demonstrate that 
                                                        
 438. See, e.g., Aaron H. Caplan, Freedom of Speech in School and Prison, 85 WASH. L. 
REV. 71 (2010) (examining problematic implications of judges’ use of comparisons 
between operational needs of prisons and schools to justify restrictions on student 
speech); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 441 (1999) (noting disturbing parallels in increasing judicial receptivity to 
administrators’ claimed need for sweeping authority to restrict basic rights in prisons 
and schools). 
 439. See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing Walker-Serrano II, 325 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
 440. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing Lowery v. Euverrard, 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007)). 
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alternative mechanisms were available for students to communicate 
their concerns to school authorities and, potentially, to the public. 
Ensuring that schools maintain appropriately dissent-receptive 
environments requires re-examining the quality of judicial scrutiny 
applied when school officials silence or punish student critics.  This 
Section urges courts to acknowledge the heightened vulnerability of 
the student speaker who offers a critical perspective on school 
functioning and to exhibit sensitivity to how schools’ and courts’ 
responses to student dissent can shape or deform students’ 
understanding of First Amendment commitments. 
After examining how schools have restricted student speech 
addressing highly charged topics or introducing controversial 
perspectives, John Taylor has concluded that Tinker’s current formula 
fails to offer student speakers adequate protection against purposeful 
viewpoint discrimination.441  The possibility that school officials’ 
adverse reactions to student speech may be predicated on viewpoint 
hostility rather than valid institutional concerns will likely be 
considerably greater when students air their complaints about school 
operations, effectively targeting either the officials with the power to 
restrict or punish the student critics or members of a larger 
bureaucracy from whom such officials may fear retribution if they fail 
to squelch student criticism. 
To formulate his recommendations for modifications to the Tinker 
standard to more reliably inhibit educators’ viewpoint discriminatory 
restrictions of student speech,442 Taylor productively mines Elena 
Kagan’s insight that First Amendment doctrine may be most 
coherently understood as the Court’s effort to uncover improper 
government motives for speech restrictions.443  Kagan describes the 
doctrinal approaches created and used by the Court as “tools to flush 
out illicit motives and to invalidate actions infected with them.”444  
Kagan persuasively traces the possible genesis of this “motive-
hunting” project445 to the Court’s apprehension “that the 
government will err, as a result of self-interest or bias” when it acts to 
curtail speech.446  First Amendment rules advancing these concerns 
                                                        
 441. John E. Taylor, Tinker and Viewpoint Discrimination, 77 UMKC L. REV. 569, 
577, 591–95 (2009). 
 442. Taylor recommends altering the Tinker inquiry to require school officials to 
show that challenged speech restrictions are narrowly tailored to remedy or prevent a 
substantial disruption of the school environment.  See id. at 608–23. 
 443. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose:  The Role of Governmental Motive in 
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996). 
 444. Id. 
 445. Id. 
 446. Id. at 512. 
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serve as “double proxies,” working to unearth unacceptable motives 
and then to illuminate problematic effects on public discourse and 
community governance.447  Kagan regards this analytical method as a 
plausible rendition of the demands of a crucial strand within 
American political theory: 
The democratic project is one of constant collective self-
determination; expressive activity is the vehicle through which a 
sovereign citizenry engages in this process by mediating diverse 
views on the appropriate nature of the community.  Were the 
government to limit speech based on its sense of which ideas have 
merit, it would expropriate an authority not intended for it and 
negate a critical aspect of self-government.  Democracy demands 
that sovereign citizens, through each generation, retain authority 
to evaluate competing visions and their adherents—to decide 
which ideas and officials merit approval.  Hence democracy bars 
the government from restricting speech (as it also bars the 
government from limiting the franchise) on the ground that such 
activity will challenge reigning beliefs or incumbent officials.  The 
government must treat all ideas as contingent, because subject to 
never-ending popular scrutiny.  On this view, the prohibition of 
certain motives again serves as a way to delineate the proper sphere 
of authority, hereby preventing a democratic state from 
contravening key principles of self-government and thereby 
undermining its foundation.448 
The failure to adopt an analytical framework with the sensitivity to 
detect possible improper motives by government decision-makers, 
motives that could thwart rather than facilitate the achievement of 
operational objectives, has been a serious deficiency in what has been 
described as “the emerging First Amendment law of managerial 
prerogative,” 449 an approach manifested in recent decisions such as 
Garcetti v. Ceballos but also identifiable in the Supreme Court’s 
student speech cases.450  Lawrence Rosenthal has argued that the First 
Amendment can tolerate the imposition of some restraints on speech 
in governmental enterprises because such limitations “ensure[] that 
                                                        
 447. Id. at 509–10. 
 448. Id. at 513–14. 
 449. Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial 
Prerogative, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 86–93 (2008).  Rosenthal’s effort to explain and 
defend some governmental authority to limit speech draws on Robert Post’s work 
illuminating how the Supreme Court’s introduction of a distinction between 
government acting as sovereign or regulator and government acting as manager had 
reshaped First Amendment doctrine.  See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS:  
DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 234–67 (1995) (arguing that the differences 
between governance and management theories track closely with distinctions created 
between treatment of speech in public and nonpublic forums, respectively). 
 450. Rosenthal, supra note 449, at 93–95. 
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political officials have effective control over the functioning of public 
offices—and therefore are fairly held politically accountable for the 
operations of those offices.”451  However, Rosenthal qualifies his 
endorsement of the managerial prerogative justification for speech 
restrictions, noting that its use to pursue some governmental 
objectives would not be regarded as legitimate.452  As examples of 
improper objectives pursued through managerial control over 
speech, Rosenthal identifies the enforcement of ideological 
conformity through loyalty oaths453 or patronage regimes454 as well as 
the punishment of employees speaking as citizens, not as employees, 
on a matter of public concern.455  This attempt to differentiate proper 
from improper bases for a claimed managerial need to control 
speech corroborates the Kagan intuition that the motive for the 
government’s restriction often plays a submerged but critical role in 
the assessment of its authority to regulate speech.  If, for example, 
the government acts on the basis of a motive detached from 
appropriate concerns such as the promotion of program efficacy, the 
foundation for its assertion of a need for managerial control of 
speech dissolves. 
As recent work by scholars at the Cultural Cognition Project (CCP) 
demonstrates, the extent to which observers interpret the actions of 
protesters or dissenting speakers as posing a threat to public order 
varies significantly depending on whether those observers regard the 
protesters as sharing or challenging their cultural outlooks.456  These 
experimental results reveal the power of cultural cognition, a kind of 
“motivated reasoning that promotes congruence between a person’s 
defining group commitments, on the one hand, and his or her 
perceptions of risk and related facts, on the other.”457  The CCP 
                                                        
 451. Id. at 34. 
 452. Id. at 39. 
 453. Id. at 65–66. 
 454. Id. at 66. 
 455. Id. (referencing Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)). 
 456. See Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw A Protest”:  Cognitive Illiberalism and the 
Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851 (2012).  In the study, 202 participants 
were asked to view silent video footage of demonstrators outside of what they were 
told was either an abortion clinic or a military recruitment center, prompting the 
participants to ascribe to the protesters (whose signs were obscured) either an anti-
abortion stance or a message opposing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”  Id. at 869–71, 873.  
“The study focused on the lawfulness of police action to halt a political 
demonstration for allegedly obstructing, threatening, or intimidating members of 
the public.”  Id. at 862.  If the associated position of protesters differed from the 
observers’ worldviews, identified through previously administered surveys, the 
observers were more likely to report that the police response was justified.  Id. at 
878–80. 
 457. Id. at 859.  The CCP scholars explain that cultural cognition arises from the 
experience of “identity threat”: 
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researchers’ findings show how these perceptions have the potential 
to be legally consequential, particularly in First Amendment cases in 
which the constitutionality of government action turns on an 
evaluation of whether the government acted to maintain necessary 
public order or merely invoked the responsibility for maintaining 
order to mask the suppression of disquieting but not disruptive 
dissent.458  Discerning how the legal system could minimize the effects 
of cultural cognition’s problematic distortions in judgment is a 
complex challenge.459  However, one modest and defensible strategy 
in this specific student speech context, cases involving students’ 
criticism of school operations, would be to evaluate school officials’ 
disciplinary response by proceeding with an inquiry built out of the 
approach developed to resolve First Amendment retaliation claims, 
an approach similar to the Ninth Circuit’s method in Pinard.460  By 
undertaking a more demanding review of schools’ reactions to 
student dissent, courts would exert a disciplining influence on 
educators, teaching both school officials and students that our claims 
of allegiance to First Amendment norms have credibility.461 
The censoring or punishment of a student-critic should trigger 
more careful interrogation of school officials’ motivation, an inquiry 
performed with less deference and more skepticism than the 
application of Tinker’s disruption test has generally triggered.  This 
inquiry could, of course, draw on statements by school personnel that 
demonstrate hostility to the student criticism, evidence like that 
presented in Lowery and Walker-Serrano.  In addition, a reviewing court 
could test the credibility of purported operational justifications for 
the school’s response by examining whether school officials can 
substantiate that it was the operational impact of the student’s 
                                                        
An individual who comes to see behavior important to his cultural group 
as detrimental to society risks estrangement from those on whom he 
depends for material and emotional support.  If the behavior is a source of 
status for the individual or for the group, then the prospect that others 
might form such a belief can diminish an individual’s social standing 
generally.  The mechanisms that cultural cognition comprises—from 
biased assimilation to selective attention and recall to skewed perceptions 
of expert credibility—all derive from the impulse to dismiss evidence that 
has these identity-threatening consequences. 
Id. at 895. 
 458. Id. at 854. 
 459. Id. at 895–99 (describing potential corrective responses to cultural 
cognition). 
 460. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 
2007)). 
 461. See Stanley Ingber, Liberty and Authority:  Two Facets of the Inculcation of Virtue, 
69 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 421, 460–61 (1995) (describing salutary effects of judicial 
oversight of school officials’ restrictive responses to student speech). 
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delivery of the critical message, not the message itself, which 
prompted the disciplinary reaction.  The integrity of this variant on a 
secondary effects defense would be greatly enhanced by a showing 
that the school afforded the student-critic adequate alternative 
channels by which he or she could deliver the relevant complaints 
and concerns. 
An appraisal of the adequacy of those channels would properly 
consider their visibility and accessibility, their incorporation of 
protective features, such as the availability of a bypass mechanism that 
would not require a student to present grievances to the school 
official whose conduct is at issue, and the extent to which these 
mechanisms provide transparency, allowing the public but, perhaps 
even more importantly, members of the school community, including 
other students, the opportunity to learn the substance of the student 
grievance and the basis for its resolution.462  This kind of scrutiny 
would incentivize schools to re-examine their existing grievance 
procedures, assessing how such regimes, installed to comply with the 
obligations of federal civil rights laws, could be reworked to expand 
students’ opportunities to register and resolve their complaints about 
school life.  By expanding the opportunities for students to air and 
resolve grievances in school, educators might be able diffuse student 
frustration and hostility and offer needed guidance to students on 
how to communicate complaints in a persuasive, respectful, and 
responsible manner.463  This kind of approach could potentially 
                                                        
 462. This mode of analysis would import an incentive structure like that used to 
prevent and address workplace sexual harassment.  See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 
524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (concluding that when a plaintiff alleges that a supervisor has 
created hostile work environment but taken no tangible employment action, the 
employer entity can assert an affirmative defense to vicarious liability by showing that 
the employer had taken reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct any sexually 
harassing behavior and that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of the available complaint process and/or other preventive and corrective 
mechanisms); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (same).  Such 
a complaint procedure would have to be well-publicized, efficient, and effective to 
demonstrate requisite care.  To comply with federal civil rights statutes, districts are 
already required to publicize and implement grievance procedures that provide for the 
prompt, equitable resolution of student and employee discrimination complaints.  See 
34 C.F.R. § 104.7(b) (2011); id. § 104.8 (2011); id. § 106.8(b) (2011); id. § 106.9 
(2011); 28 C.F.R. § 35.106 (2010); id. § 35.107(b) (2010). 
 463. LEVINSON, NO CITIZEN, supra note 383, at 179 (criticizing vicious cycle in 
which schools, unwilling to trust students, deny them chances to make choices and 
take responsibility at school, leading some students to act irresponsibly and, in turn, 
precipitating greater restrictions on expression which ultimately exacerbate civic 
competency deficits). 
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reduce the mounting number of incidents involving extreme, vulgar, 
and intemperate on-line student speech about school personnel.464 
A suitably demanding review should also address the nature of the 
sanction imposed, exploring whether a sanction’s potential 
disproportionality conveys an intent to retaliate against a student 
critic and to deter future dissenters.  Officials’ recourse to the most 
severe sanctions, such as expulsion, long-term suspension, and 
permanent ineligibility from participation in school activities, could 
signal the presence of a problematic motive.465  Perhaps most 
importantly, a reviewing court would examine how the school has 
engaged with the substance of a student’s grievance.  Although the 
use of intemperate or vulgar language to communicate a complaint 
can be properly reprimanded, that defect in presentation should not 
automatically nullify school officials’ obligation to acknowledge a 
student’s concerns and to offer a reasoned explanation of its 
resolution, including the steps taken to investigate the basis for the 
student’s complaint.466  Conversely, a student who, when disciplined, 
                                                        
 464. See generally Katherine Hokenson, Comment, My Teacher Sux! [Censored]:  
Protecting Students’ Right to Free Speech on the Internet, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER 
& INFO. L. 385, 407–08 (2011) (examining proliferating controversies involving 
students’ online criticism of school personnel).  Cases examining such incidents 
include:  Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 
2011) (en banc) (invalidating suspension of high school student for creating fake 
MySpace profile of principal); Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1367, 1374 (S.D. 
Fla. 2010) (finding suspension of student for creating Facebook group entitled “Ms. 
Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I’ve ever met” violated the First Amendment); 
Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448 (W.D. Pa. 2001) 
(invalidating suspension of high school student who had e-mailed classmates “Top 
Ten” list about school athletic director, deriding his appearance, including the size 
of his genitals); cf. Cuff ex rel. B.C. v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 677 F.3d 109, 111 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (upholding suspension of ten-year-old fifth grader based on his crayon 
drawing of astronaut expressing wish to “[b]low up the school with the teachers in 
it”).  For thoughtful explorations of First Amendment issues raised by student on-
line speech, including speech directed at school officials, see Mary-Rose Papandrea, 
Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027 (2008), recommending 
school initiatives to educate students about responsible use of digital media as more 
effective than punitive responses and more consistent with First Amendment 
principles, and Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority:  Hostile Speech About 
School Officials and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 591 
(2011) [hereinafter Waldman, Badmouthing Authority], recommending that school 
officials have latitude to suppress dissent only under narrow interpretations what 
constitutes disruptive or offensive speech. 
 465. See Rebecca L. Zeidel, Note, Forecasting Disruption, Forfeiting Speech:  Restrictions 
on Student Speech in Extracurricular Activities, 53 B.C. L. REV. 303 (2012) (describing 
school officials’ termination of students’ eligibility to participate in school sports 
teams, student government, and other extra-curricular activities as punishment for 
speech deemed disruptive). 
 466. See Bell v. Itawamba Cnty. Sch. Bd., 859 F. Supp. 2d 834, 840–41 (N.D. Miss. 
2012) (upholding students’ suspension for Facebook posting of profanity-laden rap 
alleging coach’s improper behavior toward female students without addressing the 
school’s investigation of the substance of the students’ accusations). 
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attempts to restyle personal harassment or credible threats to harm a 
teacher or administrator as a poorly crafted substantive critique 
should not expect a warm reception from a reviewing court.467 
These analytical modifications would move toward a form of review 
reminiscent of intermediate scrutiny, a shift responsive to what Scott 
Moss has labeled the “excessive institutional tailoring” of First 
Amendment doctrine in cases involving schools, government 
workplaces, and prisons.468  Moss has proposed that use of an 
intermediate scrutiny standard could counteract courts’ disturbing 
tendency to understate the risk of reflexively accepting relevant 
institutional decision-makers’ claimed expertise in assessing the 
operational costs and benefits of less restrictive expressive 
environments.469  Moss asserts that the current doctrinal approach to 
the protection of the speech of public school students, government 
workers, and prisoners may actually exaggerate the uniqueness of 
such institutional environments.470  Courts’ too-ready acceptance of 
claims that special institutional imperatives necessitate limiting 
expressive freedom could obscure the real possibility that 
government officials’ reactions could reflect the kind of deeply 
problematic motives that justify vigorous judicial interrogation of the 
basis for comparable restrictions outside such domains.471  Like the 
Moss proposal, this Article’s recommended legal standard 
acknowledges that a school official is likely to be no less susceptible 
than other governmental actors to the temptation to react to speech 
on the basis of how it complicates the official’s administrative task or 
deviates from the official’s own preferred viewpoint, potentially 
skewing the calculus to favor the official’s own interest.472 
However, this Article’s central ambition in constructing its 
recommended form of heightened scrutiny is the reinvigoration of 
                                                        
 467. See Waldman, Badmouthing Authority, supra note 464, at 593 (examining the 
constitutional bases for differentiating schools’ authority to respond to speech that 
arguably threatens or primarily directs vulgarity at a school official and a more 
complex category of student expression:  “speech that, while expressing non-
threatening hostility toward a school official, also expresses a substantive viewpoint 
about that official’s behavior”). 
 468. Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners—Oh, My!  A Cautionary Note 
About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1635 
(2007). 
 469. Id. at 1674–78. 
 470. Id. at 1671. 
 471. Id. at 1677, 1679. 
 472. Cf. Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 876 
(2008) (arguing that because schools and universities are “speech institutions that 
enhance the marketplace of ideas,” lawmakers and courts can properly give 
deference to judgments “choosing and applying rules designed to protect their 
institutional missions”). 
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educators’ appreciation of the uniquely significant role schools play 
in cultivating students’ speech-related citizenship capabilities and of 
schools’ attendant obligation to guard against the devaluation of 
student dissent.  By treating students’ youth and susceptibility to 
influence as inevitable counterweights473 that tip constitutional 
balancing against offering latitude to dissent about issues in or 
affecting the school, educators and courts fail to consider how the 
stifling of such expression could derail an essential pedagogical 
project for public education.  Highlighting how this kind of 
miscalculation can lead to missed opportunities, Emily Buss notes 
children’s need for both “controlled influence and opportunities for 
rights exercise”: 
Schools serve as one of the primary sites for positive influence, for 
the development of basic intellectual skills, the acquisition of 
knowledge, and the cultivation of prosocial behavior.  To 
accomplish all this, schools need a level of control that may justify a 
diminution of rights.  But schools are also one of the best testing 
grounds for the exercise of rights, offering students a society of 
peers with whom to interact and a governmental authority 
structure against which to push.  Any analysis that takes only one of 
these two mechanisms of influence into account is developmentally 
incomplete.474 
Thus, as Buss argues, giving children the opportunity to 
experiment with their rights may serve society’s interest in children 
becoming effective “rights exercisers”.475  Providing such 
opportunities is particularly important because children and 
adolescents are “[d]evelopmentally primed”476 to question and 
learn as they test their understandings and beliefs, including their 
understandings of and beliefs about the nature of citizenship and 
the authority.  The experiences students have when they try to speak 
to school officials, embodiments of state power, will foreseeably 
shape their future habits and expectations as citizens of a 
constitutional democracy.477   
                                                        
 473. See Buss, supra note 61, at 356 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s 
interpretations of children’s constitutional rights that “predictably cast the 
circumstances of childhood as a counterweight” to claims advancing a more 
capacious framing of children’s entitlements). 
 474. Id. at 361–62. 
 475. Id. at 361. 
 476. Id. at 380. 
 477. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
The equivocal reception students receive from courts when they 
invoke the First Amendment’s protection against the suppression or 
punishment of acts of petition and protest reveals the devaluation of 
students’ citizenship and of their potential to contribute to school 
improvement.  From a practical perspective, such a deflated appraisal 
of students’ capacities fails to apprehend the utility of student 
expression, as schools work to identify and eliminate sources of 
discord, dissatisfaction, and misunderstanding that compromise the 
academic environment.  Moreover, too hastily forestalling students’ 
opportunities to engage both their peers and school officials when 
facing perceived injustice or dysfunction licenses school officials’ 
abdication or even repudiation of an implicit but essential 
instructional obligation—the cultivation of constitutional citizenship 
capabilities.  
Lower courts’ vigilance in protecting the participatory dimensions 
of citizenship at school has been inconsistent, a deficiency likely 
traceable to changing cues from the Supreme Court’s student speech 
cases.  Marked by a gradual shift from staunch validation of the value 
of discussion and dissent toward mounting apprehension about the 
costs of tolerating students’ intemperate or clumsy experiments with 
expression, the Supreme Court’s student speech precedents echo 
many educators’ insistent assertion that a wider range of expressive 
latitude for students would be incompatible with an ordered and safe 
school environment.  This view mistakenly communicates that 
citizenship requires only obedience, not critical engagement. 
The image of the student as a passive recipient of constitutional 
inculcation rather than as an agent of constitutional enforcement 
and institutional reform may be more palatable to school officials, 
but it is not an adequate rendition of constitutional citizenship.  
Schools should acknowledge that opportunities for students to air 
grievances and receive respectful responses would fulfill rather than 
impede schools’ instructional duties.  By failing to apply sufficiently 
rigorous scrutiny to school officials’ justifications for the silencing of 
student dissent, courts become complicit in schools’ dereliction of 
their duty to help students acquire the capabilities of citizenship. 
 
